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I. INTRODUCTION

Judges and judicial candidates are regularly restricted in their political
speech and association by two categories of ethical canons that have only
recently come under constitutional examination: those that restrict the
ways judges conduct their own campaigns,' and those that restrict judges'
participation in other aspects of politics, including non-judicial campaigns.
The first category includes, among other prohibitions, bans on soliciting
campaign contributions or making pledges, promises, or commitments of
on-the-bench conduct.2 The second category includes restrictions on taking
positions of leadership within political parties,3 contributing to other
candidates' campaigns,4 and publicly indicating support for (or opposition
to) a candidate for non-judicial office.' Whether any of these restrictions
on political activity will survive review in future cases depends on a
judicial assessment of the importance of the interests they
serve-advancing judicial independence and the confidence of the public
in blind justice-and the weighing of those interests against judges' rights
of free expression.6

1. Judges in thirty-nine states, comprising eighty-seven percent of all judges in the United
States, are elected. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 209-11
(2002); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL

SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION (2002).
2. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2) (2000).
3. See id. Canon 5A(l)(a).
4. See id. Canon 5A(l)(e).
5. See id. Canon 5A(1)(b).
6. Not even political speech enjoys absolute protection from regulation so long as the speech
limitations satisfy strict scrutiny by advancing a "compelling state interest" in a "narrowly tailored"
fashion. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195-200, 206-11 (1992) (plurality opinion); see also
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (reiterating "narrowly tailored"
requirement); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982) (allowing the possibility that
restrictions on campaign speech may be constitutional if "supported by not only a legitimate state
interest, but a compelling one, and [if] the restriction operate[s] without unnecessarily
circumscribing protected expression"); EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED
STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 224 (2d ed. 2005) ("[A]t least in theory
even the most important kinds of speech can be restricted if the government has a really good
reason for restricting them, and enacts a law that's sufficiently carefully crafted."). Justice Kennedy
has argued that content-based restrictions on speech, not within traditional exceptions to the First
Amendment, should be held unconstitutional without regard to compelling interests or narrow
tailoring. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members ofN.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that traditional First Amendment speech should
always be protected regardless of the interests at stake); see also infra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text. Though it applied strict scrutiny, White did not hold that that standard, as
opposed to Justice Kennedy's more absolutist vision of the First Amendment, must be used.
Instead, White noted that neither party had challenged the use of strict scrutiny in that case. White,
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
536 U.S. at 774; see also In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (observing that 2
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In the first case challenging ajudicial-campaign restriction, Republican
Partyv. White,7 the Supreme Court held that Minnesota violated the First
Amendment' by forbidding a judicial candidate from "'announc[ing]
his... views on disputed legal or political issues." 9 Though the 5-4 split
in White was a familiar one, with the five most conservative Justices in the
majority and the four most liberal dissenting, the split was unusual for a
free-speech case, suggesting that the Justices were motivated by something
other than their solicitude for the place of free expression in American
society.
This Article argues that rather than reflecting differing positions on the
value of free speech, the divide between the majority and dissenting
opinions in White reflects vastly different approaches to the countermajoritarian difficulty,'0 and to the Canons l" of judicial ethics that enable
counter-majoritarian decisionmaking by permitting judges the freedom to
decide cases irrespective of public pressure. The dissenters understood
judicial independence as essential to upholding the rule of law, believing
that "[e]ven when they develop common law or give concrete meaning to
constitutional text, judges act only in the context of individual cases, the
outcome of which cannot depend on the will of the public."' 2 Such
independence, however, insulates not only the judges who always
faithfully seek to apply the law, but also those judges who use their
unaccountability to shape the law in favor of their own preferred policies.
The White majority, apparently suspicious of that potential outcome,

the Supreme Court did not decide which standard was appropriate, but apparently viewing strict
scrutiny as the most speech-protective option available).
7. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
8. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The First Amendment has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause against state infringement, see Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925), and the remainder of this Article refers to the First
Amendment, even when the governmental action in question is undertaken by a state.
9. White, 536 U.S. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2000)). This is the "announce clause."
10. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (discussing the anomaly of permitting judges to override
the choices of representative legislatures).
11. Most states' canons of judicial ethics are based on the American Bar Association's
(ABA's) Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See Leslie W. Abramson, AppearanceofImpropriety:
Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J.LEGAL
ETHICS 55, 55 (2000) (contending that forty-nine states have adopted some form ofthe ABA Model
Code). Throughout this Article, the states' codes ofjudicial conduct are referred to collectively as
the "Canons" and all quotes are from the ABA Model Code except where indicated.
12. White, 536 U.S. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); accord id. at 799 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[A judge] may make common law, but judged on the merits of individual cases, not
as a mandate
voters."). Repository, 2006
Published
by UF from
Law the
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sought to make the counter-majoritarian difficulty less difficult by making
the judiciary less counter-majoritarian.
Part II begins by analyzing the arguments in White and other judicial
free speech cases, arguing that pro-speech decisions are supported by two
different grounds: promoting democratic self-governance and encouraging
individual self-expression. Anti-speech decisions tend to focus on
concerns of institutional legitimacy. Some decisions supporting free
speech in judicial elections have looked at the policymaking capability of
courts and have reasoned that the public is entitled to affect the course of
judicially-made policy in states where judges are elected. Other decisions
may be considered more straightforward applications of traditional First
Amendment principles under an individual-rights paradigm (as opposed
to an approach under which the courts broadly oversee the democratic
process), reasoning that because the speech at issue is political, and the
content-based law restriction is designed to discourage political speech, the
regulation must fail.
Part EI examines the Justices' voting patterns and indicates that the
votes in White are unusual in light of the Justices' past behavior in freespeech cases. An evaluation of other potential explanations for the
Justices' votes in White suggests that their views on criminal procedure
and judicial power may color their views on judicial free speech.
Part IV discusses the restrictions states place on the political activity
of their judges, as to the ways elected judges may conduct their own
campaigns and the ways judges may involve themselves in political parties
or other candidates' campaigns. Part IV analyzes the interests supporting
the restrictions placed on free expression by each type of regulation. While
restrictions on the conduct ofjudicial campaigns are largely in place-and
criticized-because the writers and enforcers of the Canons do not want
the judiciary influenced by public opinion, restrictions on judicial
participation in non-judicial campaigns promote the appearance of an
apolitical judiciary, so as to increase the courts' legitimacy and power.
However, despite this apparent difference, both types of restrictions
maximize the courts' capacity to issue counter-majoritarian decisions by:
(1) discouraging the public from seeing law as a series of policy choices
and (2) limiting the chance of electoral defeat as a reprimand for judges
who make choices with which the voters disagree. White struck down the
announce clause because it facilitated counter-maj oritarian judicial policy
making, which the Justices in the White majority found troublesome. The
dissenters, who were far more accepting of independent judicial
policymaking, voted to uphold the clause for the same reason.
Part V explores the implications, in terms of both White's realism and
the hypothesized link between counter-maj oritarian power and judicial free
speech, for cases challenging restrictions on judicial involvement in nonjudicial politics. White reveals four potential paths the Court could take as

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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new cases are argued and new Justices are appointed, ranging from Justice
Kennedy's protection of "unabridged speech [a]s the foundation of
political freedom,"' 3 to Justice Scalia's protection of speech to promote
democratic self-governance, 4 to Justice Stevens's and Justice Ginsburg's
refusal to protect speech when it would impair judicial power. 5 The future
ofjudicial free speech depends on which of these paths the members of the
Court choose to pursue.
II. WHITE AND THE RHETORIC OF JUDGING JUDICIAL POLITICS

Pro-speech arguments center on two different themes: the autonomy of
the speaker and the rights of voters to affect the policy made by judges.
Pro-restriction arguments, by contrast, focus on the risks in permitting the
public to influence judicial policy.
A. The Basics and Breakdown of White
Like other restrictions on judicial campaigning, Minnesota's announce
clause attempted to protect the courts from public influence by making it
harder for the public to discover information about judicial candidates. If
a candidate cannot run an issue-based campaign, voters are inhibited from
casting votes based on the candidates' positions on those issues and using
elections to alter judicial policy. Thus, while White was a First
Amendment challenge to a restriction on campaign speech, the purposes
served by the restrictions may have led some Justices to view the case in
terms of the appropriate role of the courts in limiting majority rule. 6
Minnesota defended the announce clause as necessary to promote the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary, as well as the appearance
of independence and impartiality, but the White Court, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia, found the justifications wanting. 7 The Court rejected the
idea that states could have a compelling interest to fill their courts with
judges who had no opinions about disputed legal or political issues.'8 The
Court held that even if the clause encouraged judges to keep an open mind
about such issues,' 9 the clause was not narrowly tailored to that end and

13. Id.at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. See id.at 744-84 (majority opinion).
15. See id.at 797-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16. See generally,e.g., RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RuLE": A CONSTITUTIONAL
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994).
17. See White, 536 U.S. at 778-79.
18. Id. at 777-78.
19. The Court did not decide whether judicial open-mindedness was a compelling interest.
See id. atby
778.
Published
UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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was therefore unconstitutional.2"
Justice Kennedy went even further in his concurrence, concluding that
because the announce clause was a content-based restriction on speech,
and because no traditional exception (such as fighting words or
obscenity)2' applied, the restrictions were unconstitutional.22 Because
Justice Kennedy rejected the strict scrutiny formula, he found little need
to assess the importance of the justifications Minnesota offered for the
announce clause.23
The four dissenters, in opinions by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
countered that open-minded judges were essential to providing due process
for litigants,24 and that the very nature of law requires judges to apply rules
in ways the majority of the electorate dislikes. 25 If judges were permitted
to campaign on issues, the dissenters feared, judges would be unable to
protect the rights of the unpopular because voters would elect only those
judges whose decisions would be acceptable to the majority.
Justice Scalia responded with skepticism that such a danger would
materialize from stating one's views on the issues of the day, 26 but more
importantly, implied that bringing the judiciary more in line with public
attitudes might not be so bad after all. 27 The Court noted that judges make
policy by "shap[ing] ' '28 constitutions and "'mak[ing]'" 29 common law, and
elections were instituted in part because judicial decisions had strayed too
far from majority preferences.3"
20. See id. at 778-80.
21. See, e.g., Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words .... ") (footnote call number omitted).
22. White, 536 U.S. at 792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did suggest,
however, that a different approach might be appropriate when a state "restrict[s] the speech of
judges because they are judges-for example, as part of a code of judicial conduct" rather than
when a state restricts judges' speech because the judges are candidates. Id. at 796.
23. Id. at 793.
24. Id. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 780-81 (majority opinion).
27. See id. at 784.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. There is some dispute as to the extent to which popular control over the judiciary
drove the movement for judicial elections, but there appears to be rough agreement that
disagreement with judicial decisions under an appointive regime was at least a substantial cause.
See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: JudicialElections, the
FirstAmendment,andJudgesasPoliticians,21 YALEL. &POL'YREv. 301,310-14(2003); Kermit
L. Hall, The Judiciaryon Trial: State ConstitutionalReform and the Rise of an ElectedJudiciary,
1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 341-50 (1983); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly
Explanationsfor the Rise of the Elective Judiciaryin Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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B. Viewing Speech Restrictions as Protectionsof CounterMajoritarianPower

As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist,the judiciary must
"depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.""1 And yet since Marburyv. Madison,32 the Supreme Court has
used its power of judicial review to make great changes in American
society, even though much of the country opposed its decisions. 33 How can
the Court be so powerful in practice when its authority on paper seems so
minimal?
The consensus holds that public acceptance ofjudicial authority allows
courts to hold policymaking power without the purse or the sword. Courts
have legitimacy, in other words, even though their members are largely
unaccountable and the public disagrees with individual decisions. 4
Scholars have found "diffuse support" among the public for the
institutional judiciary that gives the Court independence to act contrary to
the public's desires.35 Thus, paradoxically, the Court relies on public
sentiment to enable it to oppose public sentiment.36 The result is a third

190,205-19 (1993). But see Roy A. Schotland, To the EndangeredSpecies List, Add. Nonpartisan
JudicialElections,39 WILLAMET-rEL. REv. 1397, 1399-1400(2003) [hereinafter Schotland, To the
EndangeredSpecies List] (arguing that judicial elections were motivated by a desire to raise the
quality of the bench, rather than as a way to alter policy); Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and
Present,andJudicialElections,35 IND. L. REv. 659, 661-62 (2001) [hereinafter Schotland, Myth,
Reality] (using extended quotation to same effect).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Revitalizing Democracy,24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 171
(2000) ("It would be incredible, if it were not true, that for the past four or five decades virtually
every change in basic issues of domestic social policy has come not from state or federal
legislatures but from the U.S. Supreme Court.").
34. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2614-20 (2003). Interestingly, members of the public who know more about the courts are less
likely to support the Supreme Court if it issues decisions with which those members of the public
disagree. See id.at 2617-20 (citing David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Supportfor the Supreme
Court as a National Policy Maker, 5 L. & POL'Y Q. 405 (1983); Gregory A. Caldeira & James
Gibson, The Etiology of PublicSupportfor the Supreme Court, 36 Am. J. POL. SCI. 635, (1992);
Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, andPublicEvaluationsofthe Supreme
Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995)).
35. See, e.g., Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 34, at 637.
36. But the nature of the Court's public support requires that the Court not oppose the public
will too much. Justice Scalia has charged his colleagues with shading their legal interpretations to
make them more palatable to the public and therefore less likely to trigger a movement to curtail
the Court's power. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-53 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the Court would invalidate more religious practices under the
Establishment Clause were it not for "the instinct for self-preservation, and the recognition that the
Court... by
cannot...
historical 2006
fact and current practice without losing all that
Published
UF Law contradict[]
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branch of government that is powerful in individual cases and yet
consciously dependent on others for its continued influence.37
From the time when United States v. Carolene Products Co. 38 gave
voice to the principle that courts have a special role to play in the defense
of individual rights,3 9 and in all likelihood since the Founding,4" the
American legal culture has recognized the benefits of having an
independent judiciary protect the people from government excesses and
the tyranny of the majority." Rash, bigoted, and ignorant majorities have

sustains it: the willingness of the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as
definitive. . . ."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J.,dissenting)
(suggesting that the principles adopted by the majority required further-reaching policy effects than
the Court was willing to acknowledge). And of course the standard interpretation of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), stresses that Marbury "had to lose," so that the political
branches would not restrict the Court's power. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury'sWrongness, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 343, 357 (2003) (arguing that if Chief Justice Marshall deliberately decided the
case so as to avoid antagonizing the Jefferson administration, his opinion stands for the proposition
that "a judge properly may refuse to do justice under the law in order to advance his own personal
power and that of other judges"). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Story ofMarbury v.
Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13 (Michael C.
Doff ed., 2004) (arguing that Marbury avoided judicial humiliation while increasing judicial
power).
37. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 304-07, 327-34 (7th ed. 2005) (noting that the outcomes of the judiciary may reflect the
political currents of the day). See generally John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999) (discussing
institutional aspects ofjudicial independence).
In the video that greets visitors to the Supreme Court, Justice Souter points to the fragility of
the Court's authority: "The power of the Court is the power of trust earned-the trust of the
American people." York Associates Television, Inc., The Supreme Court of the United States
(1997), quoted in BARBARAA.PERRY, THE PRIESTLY TRIBE: THE SUPREME COURT'S IMAGE IN THE
AMERICAN MIND 5 (1999); see also, e.g., EUGENE W. HICKOK& GARY L. McDOwELL, JUSTICE VS.
LAW: COURTS AND POLITICS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, at xi (1993) (discussing the role of courts as
problem-solving institutions); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 56 (2002) ("The Court's power rests on
its legitimacy ....).
38. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
39. See id. at 152 n.4; see also generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE
NATIONALPOLITICALPROCESS (1980) (discussing how judicial review can allow courts to hold law
unconstitutional and thus protect individual rights).
40. See Stephen B. Burbank, The ArchitectureofJudicialIndependence,72 S.CAL. L. REV.
315, 318-20 (1999).
41. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The Court stated in Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3

8

Dimino:
Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges' Political Speech
COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN POWER AND JUDGES' POLITICAL SPEECH

a sorry history in America, and elsewhere, of tyrannizing the unpopular,
and courts should have the capacity to prevent majorities from abusing
their power.42 But a judiciary with the power to check abusive
governments also has the power to define the "abuses," 4' 3 and in so doing,
the judiciary risks becoming the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse.'
Just as some fear overreaching and tyranny by legislative and popular
majorities, others fear overreaching and tyranny by an unaccountable
judiciary; if judges follow their own preferences instead of the law,
judicial independence is destructive, not only of democracy, but also of the

worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.
at 665 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court has no reason
Barnette,319 U.S. at 638; see also id.
for existence if it merely reflects the pressures of the day."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 83-87 (1989); Robert H. Bork, OurJudicialOligarchy,FIRST
THINGS, Nov-. 1996, at 21-24, reprintedin THE END OF DEMOCRACY? 10, 13 (Mitchell S. Muncy
ed., 1997) ("The Justices are not inscribing current preferences of our society into the Constitution,
for those preferences can easily be placed in statutes by legislatures.").
42. See generally Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesandthe
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.L. REv. 689 (1995) (outlining the criticisms of elective judiciary models
as being too vulnerable to such shortcomings as political pressure).
43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 828
(1982) ("The Supreme Court is our society's device for deciding that certain choices are out of
bounds. This implies that the Justices themselves are not constrained by an out-of-bounds rule and
ought not to be.").
44. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 4 (1977) ("1 liked it no better when the Court read my predilections into
the Constitution than when the Four Horsemen read in theirs."); David P. Currie, Separating
Judicial Power, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1998); Lino A. Graglia, It's Not
Constitutionalism,It's JudicialActivism, 19 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293 (1996) (explaining how
judicial independence can lead to unchecked judicial activism); Lewis A. Korhauser, Is Judicial
Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN

INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45, 51-52 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
Professor Suzanna Sherry has argued that judges from colonial times to the present have
implemented their will despite conflicting statutory or constitutional text. See generally Suzanna
Sherry,IndependentJudges and IndependentJustice, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (1998). She
argues, however, that the independence to exercise independent judgment has "been vindicated by
history," in that we have come to accept the judicial rulings in such areas as rights of slaves,
desegregation, natural rights of property, etc., which were unpopular at the time, as correct. Id. at
18-19. It seems questionable whether, in fact, history has vindicated every exercise of power she
mentions, as even today we dispute whether a court can halt a taking of property undertaken for a
private purpose. See id. at 17 (citing In re Albany Street, II Wend. 149, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834));
see also Kelo v. City ofNew London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). As even Professor Sherry recognizes,
judicial independence has enabled tyranny as well as constitutionalism by permitting judges to
render such decisions as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which she mentions, see
Sherry, supra, at 18, and scores of others, including Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
which she does not mention.
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9

Florida Law Review,
Vol. LAW
58, REVIEW
Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3
FLORIDA

[Vol. 58

rule of law.4 5 Thus, American judicial power is emblematic of
governmental power generally and exemplifies the quandary James
Madison identified in framing the Constitution: "[W]hat is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? ... [T]he great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.'"
45. See, e.g., MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIALJUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT

VS. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE (1996) (outlining the evolution of thought on the judiciary
as a political component); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROLOFAMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 260,

on file with author) ("Judicial independence is defensible only insofar as independentjudges follow
the law."); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts ofJudiciallndependence,72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535,54858 (1999); Kim Lane Scheppele, DeclarationsofIndependence: JudicialReactions to Political
Pressure,in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 44, at 227, 228 ("[J]udges
can (and some judges often [do]) bend the positive law to a judicial conception of what the law
should be, thereby challenging the political branches for the final word on what counts as law in
the first place."). Scheppele, however, is more accepting of this kind ofjudicial independence than
the quote might indicate. Cf Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlightinga Low Point on a High Court:
Some Thoughts on the Removal of PennsylvaniaSupreme CourtJustice RolfLarsenand the Limits
ofJudicialSelf-Regulation, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1041 (1995) (arguing for some legislative oversight
of the judiciary).
This Article places process-based theorists in the majoritarian category, for they see a role for
courts in overseeing the legislative process only to affect the majority's desires, rather than to
impose particular substantive values. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (discussing the Court as a referee in a representative
democracy). Both process-based theorists and those scholars who more generally disfavor judicial
oversight object to judges who reject the public's view of good policy when it conflicts with their
own, and would therefore approve of increased public input into judicial selection.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 204 (2004) (noting that efforts to influence judicial policy through the

appointments process "diminish[] the risk of a runaway judiciary .... [but] a judiciary that tends
to share prevailing cultural norms, and thus to decide cases in light of them, is not likely to be a
very robust guarantor of minority rights"); TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND
DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 131 (2004) ("[T]he Court is viewed
either as the quintessential antidemocratic institution or as an appropriate check on the other
branches of government."); Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 44, at 160, 160-61 (arguing that while light beer

may taste great and be less filling, courts cannot be both independent and accountable); David
Goldberger, The PowerofSpecialInterestGroups to Overwhelm JudicialElection Campaigns:The
TroublesomeInteractionBetween the Code ofJudicialConduct,CampaignFinanceLaws, and the
FirstAmendment, 72 U. CIN.L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) ("[W]e fear that, if[judges] are too insulated from
the political process, they will take advantage of their independence and exercise arbitrary power.
On the other hand, we want ourjudges to decide each case based on its individual merits rather than
based on acquiescence to political pressure."); John M. Walker, Jr., Politicsand the Confirmation
Process: The Importance of CongressionalRestraint in SafeguardingJudicialIndependence, 55
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) ("[A] dilemma... lies at the heart of our constitutional framework:
how do we maintain an independent judiciary to protect democratic institutions and values and, at
the same time, avoid unchecked judicial power that would destroy those institutions and values?").
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White is central to this debate because the motivation behind
restrictions on judicial speech is the promotion ofjudicial legitimacy and,
as a result, judicial power.47 Public acquiescence in judicial decisions" is
possible only where courts hold legitimacy 49 and design countless
symbolic references-from the Justices' robes to the marble palace from
where they issue their pronouncements-to inspire awe and unquestioning
obedience from the public.5" But the wisdom of inculcating public
deference and respect for the judiciary has been questioned, most notably
by some Justices5 who view unmediated democracy as occasionally or
often preferable to the oligarchical rule by unelected judges.52

47. See ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2004) (Commentary)
("Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity
and independence ofjudges."). The Model Code contains several references to the importance of
maintaining "public confidence" in the judiciary. See, e.g., id. Canon 2A (making clear that the
Model Code values legitimacy as necessary to the effective exercise of judicial power).
48. See In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Mich. 2000) (citing Lloyd B. Snyder, The
Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidatesfor
JudicialOffice, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207, 239-40 (1987)).
49. See ANN. MODELCODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1(2004) (Commentary); O'BRIEN,
supra note 37, at xvi ("[The Court's] political power... truly rests, in Chief Justice Edward
White's words, 'solely upon the approval of a free people."'); see also Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992) (stressing the damage that could be imposed to the
Court's legitimacy if it overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and stating that "[t]he Court's
power lies ... in its legitimacy," including "[t]he need for principled action to be perceived as
such...."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194(1986) (noting the Court's concern with being
"vulnerable and com[ing] near[] to illegitimacy" in expounding substantive due process doctrine);
Baker v.Carr,369 U.S. 186,267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing the need for "sustained
public confidence in [the Court's] moral sanztion"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the judiciary would be the "least dangerous"
branch because it lacked both the power of the purse and of the sword).
50. See PERRY, supranote 37 (surveying public perception, myth, and reality in the aura of
the supreme court).
51. See GEYH, supra note 45, at 270-71.
52. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217-25 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304,348-49 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,955-56 (2000)
(Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 980-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. College
of Obstreticians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632,
645-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 9991001 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see alsoROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:
MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (expounding on the argument against an attitude
of judicial supremacy); Lino A. Graglia, JudicialReview: Wrong in Principle, a Disaster in
Practice,21 Miss. C. L. REV. 243 (2002) [hereinafter Graglia, Judicial Review] (outlining the
dangers ofjudicial review in a system with unelected and unaccountable judges); Lino A. Graglia,
ConstitutionalLaw:A Rusefor Government by an IntellectualElite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 770
(1998) ("To the extent that our judges exercise [substantial policymaking] power today, we can be
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Stated differently, the courts' legitimacy is of varying importance to
different judges, depending on their judicial philosophies. Those who
believe that popular majorities pose less of a threat to the law than do
unaccountable judges have an incentive to make judges as responsive to
political desires as possible and to remove any fagade of judicial
omnipotence that inhibits the public from questioning judicial decisions.
If policy is going to be made by judges rather than by legislatures, this
philosophy, which I refer to as "majoritarianism," argues that voters
should at least be able to select judges who share their policy views.
Majoritarians are skeptical of creating a "compelling interest" in the public
appearance of "neutral" justice because judges are policymakers with
social and political views that often preordain their constitutional,
statutory, and common law interpretations. If those views are to determine
the content of the Constitution and other laws, majoritarians would prefer
that judges have the political views of the median voter, and may therefore
be expected to take a dim view of judicial speech restrictions that
embolden the judiciary to take unpopular positions.53
Those who view the courts more as bulwarks against majoritarian
excess, however, have more to fear from an accountable judiciary than do
those who criticize the courts for being undemocratic. Accordingly, these
counter-majoritarians are more receptive to the forced separation ofjudges
from politics. For them, the judiciary, drawn from the country's "natural
aristocracy,"54 is a moderating force on democracy, and indeed the need
for a judiciary-and the Constitution itself-stems from the fear that the
public will abuse the power of majority rule unless checked."
Note that this dichotomy between majoritarians and counter-maj oritarians
does not necessarily lead to a liberal/conservative split as in White.5 6 In

sure that something has gone wrong and the constitutional scheme is not being implemented, but
perverted.").
53. Not coincidentally, judicial decisions portrayed as activist were the impetus for the
modem push for judicial accountability. See Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and
Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 99-107
(1998); see also Hans A. Linde, The Judge as PoliticalCandidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 14
(1991) ("[C]ourts give up their defense against the charge that law is nothing more than politics
when they explain their decisions as a choice of social policy with little effort to attribute that
choice to any law."); Stephen Markman, The Debate over the Judiciary, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
443, 451 (2001).

54. EDMUND BURKE, An Appealfrom the New to the Old Whigs (1791), quoted in BURKE'S
POLITICS 390, 397-98 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (arguing that voters should
choose representatives of superior judgment, and then permit the representatives to exercise their
judgment in governing).
55. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (casting the debate over majoritarian tyranny in the light
of race and race relations).
56. It may seem odd that majoritarian judges would be more likely to strike down a Canon
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than would an anti-majoritarian. Nevertheless, there are several reasons majoritarians would not
exhibit deference to decisions that restrict judges' rights of political participation. First, the Canons
prohibitingjudicial speech are often passed, not by democratically elected majorities in legislatures,
but by the very judicial institutions benefited by the legitimacy that comes from limiting discussion
about them. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 758 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("[T]he
fruits of Canon 5 appear to bear witness to its remarkably pro-incumbent character."); Michael R.
Dimino, The Futile Questfor a System ofJudicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 811 &
n.34 (2004); cf ELY, supranote 45, at 120 ("We cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out .... ).
Second, insofar as politically responsible institutions fashion the rules ofjudicial conduct, judges
who challenged bans on their political involvement were prohibited from participating in the
process that led to the adoption of the rule. Under such circumstances, any deference to the state
statute is misplaced. Cf Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (arguing that deference is
inappropriate in campaign finance cases because legislators can use campaign finance rules to
entrench themselves in power); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28
(1969) (refusing to defer in cases challenging an exclusion from voting). Third, because the right
to engage in political activity is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. The question is whether the
interest asserted by the state is compelling and whether the means adopted are narrowly tailored
to serve the interest. Majoritarian judges are less likely to see state interests in enabling countermajoritarian decisions as compelling, or depriving the public of information as a narrowly tailored
means to the end, because both serve the interests of an elite minority at the expense of the
majority. Thus, while it might seem ironic for majoritarian judges to be more likely to strike down
the speech restrictions, the reason they would do so is to protect the majority from a politically
influential minority.
While a judge who adopts questionable statutory or constitutional interpretations---either
conservative or liberal-because he believes he can improve on the original language is acting in
a counter-majoritarian fashion, see, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003) (requiring Massachusetts to recognize same-sex marriages); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 30-33 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (arguing that "parent" should mean something
other than biological or adoptive mother or father (i.e., the homosexual partner of a child's parent)
when an alternative meaning would be in the child's "best interest"); GUIDO CALABRESi, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a
New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. I
(1995) (arguing that courts versed in the common law should take an active role in making law and
policy when engaged in statutory and constitutional interpretation), a judge who adopts the same
interpretation because of public-choice (or other) concerns about the legislature's
unrepresentativeness would be approaching interpretation from a majoritarian perspective, see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,562,565 (1964) ("Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.
Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.... [I]t would seem
reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's
legislators."); Friedman, supra note 34, at 2605 ("[D]uly enacted laws do not always carry with
them popular support."); Ilya Somin, PoliticalIgnoranceandthe CountermajoritarianDifficulty:
A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287
(2004) (arguing thatjudicial review is not always counter-majoritarian because legislation does not
always reflect the majority's desires). The power of the first judge, much more than the second,
would be threatened by a loss ofjudicial legitimacy. See Judith S. Kaye, Safeguardinga Crown
Jewel: JudicialIndependence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 724
(1997) (arguing against what Chief Judge Kaye termed "irresponsible" (chiefly meaning
"uninformed") criticism ofjudicial decisions, and arguing that lawyers have a duty to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary); id.at 722 ("Ipersonally enjoy the swashbuckling, romantic notion that
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theory, all judges benefit from the political insulation to decide cases
against public desires. In practice, however, a judge whose countermajoritarian preferences would not command a court57 receives no benefit
from the insulation because the policy that results from the court's
decision is not counter-majoritarian. Thus, the only judges for whom
independence is vital are those who hold preferences that are counter to
those of the public and who find agreement among other judges on the
court.
Rather than reflecting an overall liberal or conservative philosophy, the
split is between judges who agree with the public by and large in
particularly salient cases,58 and those who do not. 9 In the Lochner era,6"

judges are impervious 'to the winds of public opinion... [and that they are people] of fortitude,
able to thrive in a hardy climate."') (alteration in original) (quoting Craig v. Haney, 331 U.S. 367,
376 (1947)); Raphael Lewis & Jonathan Saltzman, SJC ChiefJusticeCounters"JudicialActivism"
Charge,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20,2004, at Al (reporting that Massachusetts Chief Justice Marshall
"dismissed what she called 'attack politics' that sometimes ensnares judges," preferring to
characterize what others have termed "'activist judges"' as merely "'doing their constitutional
duty'").
57. This analysis raises the question whether judges on multi-member courts would be more
likely to exhibit the tendency discussed here than would be trial court judges. If trial court judges
are more interested in judicial independence than are appellate judges, there could be a variety of
causes which might form the subject of future research. The trial judges may not need to concern
themselves with attaining the agreement of the rest of their court for a particular countermajoritarian opinion, and thus, they may benefit from independence that would enable the judge
not only to state an unpopular position but to implement it. On the other hand, judges' concerns
may not be with their own ability to implement their preferred policies, but with the Supreme
Court's ability to implement policy on a national scale. For trial judges with that attitude, support
for judicial independence should vary according to their agreement with the counter-majoritarian
decisions of the Supreme Court. Another factor likely to be important in trial judges' attitudes
toward judicial independence is their perception of whether they face the brunt of public criticism.
If a trial judge is more likely to suffer defeat for an unpopular decision than is an appellate judge,
the trial judge might place a higher value on judicial independence. If however, trial court elections
are uncontested and defeat is not a realistic possibility, see generally Michael E. Solimine, The
Future ofParity,46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1491-94 (2005) (discussing judicial reforms and
the realistic prospect of change), then those judges may be more accepting in allowing the public
to influence other judges.
58. Cf Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual
Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 468, 489-90 (1997)
(hypothesizing that "the relative salience of the different issue domains determines the relative
responsiveness of the justices to mood").
59. One may refer to the distinction as being between activist and restraintist judges or
between interventionist and non-interventionist ones. See EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM, INTERVENTIONISM, AND THE POLITICS OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW

passim (1994). I prefer not to use the term "judicial activist" because its meaning is disputed and
the phrase is used more often as an epithet than a descriptive moniker. See Randy E. Barnett, Is the
Rehnquist Court an "Activist" Court?: The Commerce Clause Cases,73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275,
1275 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in JudicialActivism?,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002) (opining that "judicial activism" has been appropriated by
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when the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to invalidate
restrictions on economic liberty,6 it was in conservatives' interest to
increase judicial legitimacy, by convincing the public that liberty of
contract was "law," not "politics," 2 and that it was in liberals' interest to
deprive the Court of any legitimacy that came from invoking the
Constitution to conceal a policy choice.6 3 Likewise, if the most salient
constitutional issue for the Court was the Contracts Clause, the minimal
enforcement of which does not seem to trouble the public at all,' then
conservatives would be in a position to fear a decrease in legitimacy that
comes from appearing to decide cases both on the basis of politics65 and

adherents of so many conflicting philosophies as to mean only "Judges Behaving Badly-and each
person fills in a different definition of 'badly'); Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and
Current Meanings of "JudicialActivism, "92 CAL. L. REv. 1441 (2004) (surveying the different
meanings of the term but arguing that, when properly defined, "judicial activism" can be a useful
term for analyses of judicial decisionmaking). See generally Bradley C. Canon, Defining the
Dimensions ofJudicialActivism,66 JUDICATURE 236 (1983) (identifying six specific elements that
give structure to the concept of judicial activism). For me, a judicial activist is one who reads his
own policy preferences into the law under the guise of"interpretation." See Laurence H. Silberman,
Will Lawyering Strangle DemocraticCapitalism?:A Retrospective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
607, 618 (1998). My point has less to do with whether a particular decision is based on a judge's
policy preferences or the Constitution, and more to do with whether the decision supports or
opposes the policy preference seen as popular by the public. To avoid the further risk of confusion,
I do not use the term "democratic" to refer to a conception of judging in a manner solicitous of
public desires. I prefer the terms "majoritarian" and "counter-majoritarian" to refer to those judges
who validate popular measures and to those who oppose them, respectively.
60. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61. See, e.g., id.
62. See, e.g., id. at 56-57. The Lochner Court stated:
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for that of the
legislature. If the act be within the power of the state it is valid, although the
judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law.
But the question would still remain: Is it within the police power of the state? and
that question must be answered by the court.
Id.
63. See, e.g., id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.").
64. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States FederalCourtsin Interpretingthe Constitution andLaws, inA MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 43 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("The [constitutional] provision
prohibiting impairment of the obligation of contracts... has been gutted. I am sure that We the
People agree with that development; we value property rights less than the Founders did.").
65. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 330 ("The Court's prestige rests on preserving the
public's view that justices base their decisions on interpretations of the law, rather than on their
personal policy preferences."); James L. Gibson et al., Why Do PeopleAccept PublicPolicies They
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that are inconsistent with majority preferences.66
However, at this point in our constitutional history, conservative
counter-majoritarian67 decisions are not typically well-covered by the
media, often invalidate statutes the public was not aware existed,6" and are
not "of particular concern to Congress."6 9 As a result, decisions like
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,70 New York v. UnitedStates, 7' and even United
States v. Lopez72 and United States v. Morrison73 are unlikely to provoke
any great public outcry.74 Moreover, on the rare occasions "when Congress
does respond to the Court, it [i.e., Congress] has been compliant. It has
treated Court rulings
as final and authoritative-a precedent to deal with,
7
not to overrule.", 1

By contrast, liberal counter-majoritarian decisions in such "politically
[c]ostly, [d]ivisive [s]ocial [i]ssues ' ' 76 as gay rights,77 religion, 78 and the
death penalty79 are much more likely to provoke opposition from the
public because they are easier to understand and trigger more emotional

Oppose?: Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 192

(2005).
66. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REV. 849, 855-56
(1989) (arguing that originalism operates to preserve liberty where protected in the Constitution,
and giving as examples the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Contracts
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, as provisions that the Court has insufficiently protected when
public opinion has viewed those liberties as undesirable).
67. The federalism cases may not be counter-majoritarian at all even though they involve the
invalidation of statutes. See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and
Function of JudicialReview, 72 U. CIN.L. REV. 1257, 1299 (2004).
68. See Friedman, supranote 34, at 2621-23; Franklin & Kosaki, supranote 34 (Lee Epstein
ed., 1995) (demonstrating the effect of media coverage on public knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions).
69. Neal Devins, The MajoritarianRehnquist Court?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72
(2004); see also Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court,78 IND. L.J. 123,
128 (2003). But see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 230-32 (2004).
70. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
71. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
72. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
73. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
74. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 69, at 66-69 (arguing that the public's lack of interest in
federalism means that the Court can strike down legislation in that area without being significantly
anti-majoritarian); see also Somin, supranote 56, at 1333-36 (noting that most legislation is either
unknown to citizens or too complex to understand).
75. Devins, supra note 69, at 73.
76. Id. at 76.
77. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
78. See McCreary Countyv. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Newdowv. U.S. Congress, 328
F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
79. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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reactions than does, for example, the extent of sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment."0 Thus, while conservatives strike down some
laws supported by majorities of the voting public, the relative lack of
salience for issues of federalism means that they have less to fear if the
courts' legitimacy were undermined than do judges who invoke the ideal
of a "living Constitution" to expand individual rights beyond those the
majority wishes to accept.
Accordingly, if limitations on political involvement are designed to
insulate judges from criticism and to protect counter-majoritarian
decisions, the judges we can expect to support those limitations are the
judges who issue decisions at odds with public preferences in salient cases.
They have the most to lose. If the public refuses to follow a judicial
decree-either by adopting a constitutional amendment, attempting to put
judges with opposing views on the bench, encouraging resistance by other
branches of government, or otherwise-then the judge's preferred decision
will have a reduced effect.
Conversely, those judges who decide cases consistent with public
views will likely be the ones least supportive of limitations that increase
judicial legitimacy. For if the judiciary is seen as illegitimate and people
lose respect for the courts, a majoritarian judge has not lost much. Indeed,
if the majoritarian judge has dissented from a counter-majoritarian
decision and the court's legitimacy is questioned, the majoritarian judge's
preference is advanced.
As Professor Pamela Karlan has stated, "[W]e must measure the claims
for judicial freedom against the results judges produce."" And because
neither the judiciary, nor the legal community, nor the country has
developed a consensus on what makes a judicial decision "correct," it is
impossible to make an argument for or against judicial independence that
does not ultimately reduce to expressing a preference for either the views
of judicial elites or the public. 2 This Article argues that the debate on
judicial politics should be viewed through this lens of result orientation.
Both rhetoric and empirical data support the proposition that the debate
over judicial free speech is more about judicial power than free speech. 3

80. To be sure, the conservative position on social issues is not always consonant with
majority public opinion. Nevertheless, with some notable exceptions, see, e.g., McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003) (upholding "Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole"),
conservative counter-majoritarianism tends to sustain statutes opposed by certain subsets of the
public, whereas liberal counter-majoritarianism on social issues strikes down popular statutes.
81. Karlan, supra note 45, at 558.
82. See Dimino, supra note 56, at 810-18.
83. Professor Richard Fallon has similarly noted that the Justices' approaches to questions
of commercial speech neatly correlate with their positions on commercial regulation more
generally. See FALLON, supra note 46, at 49-51.
Similarly,
the Justices'
application
of the Voting
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Those Justices who favor expansion of judicial power and who use that
power to make unpopular policy by, for example, issuing decisions
favoring criminal defendants, have supported the speech restrictions and
have used arguments advancing the courts' traditional function as a haven
for individual rights against an oppressive majority. By contrast, Justices
who favor the more politically popular conservative cause in criminal
cases and who favor restricting judicial power have been those voting to
strike down the restrictions. And the language those Justices have
employed, in judicial opinions and elsewhere, has exhibited a realistic
understanding of the judicial process, under which extra-legal factors
affect judicial decisions and under which the political process affects
policy in part through its selection of judges.84 The Justices' positions in
free-speech cases-which might be thought to be of the utmost relevance
in evaluating a First Amendment challenge to restrictions on political
speech-turn out not to be indicative of the Justices' positions on judicial
speech.
C. Why ProtectJudges' PoliticalSpeech?: Instrumentalism,
Autonomy, and Realism
There are at least two reasons to support the right of judges to
participate meaningfully in campaigns, and the White majority invoked
both. 5 First, judges, like other candidates and autonomous members of a
free society, should have the right to discuss matters of public interest and
to persuade their fellow citizens that a certain policy or set of policies
should be adopted 6 (refered to in this Article as the argument based on
right of individuals to an equal opportunity to elect "representatives" of their choice) to judicial
elections may have more to do with their attitudes toward the Voting Rights Act than their views
of whether judges are "representatives" or something else. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
384 (1991) (concluding, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by, inter alia, Justices O'Connor
and Souter, and over the dissent of Justice Scalia, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy, that elected judges are "representatives" for purposes of the Act); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,466-67 (1991) (concluding, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, that judges are appointees "on
the policymaking level" and thus excluded from the protections of the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967(ADEA)).
84. See generally, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964)
(analyzing the power that Supreme Court Justices wield once appointed); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrrUDINAL MODEL REVISrrED (2002)
(discussing the role ofjudges as policy makers).
85. These reasons parallel the debate on whether to adopt judicial elections altogether, see
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (gratuitously commenting that
adopting an elective system for selectingjudges was "perhaps a decision of questionable wisdom"),
providing further support for believing that the fight in these cases is primarily overjudicial power
and not the marketplace of ideas or self-realization through speech.
86. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82, 788 (2002) (arguing that speech 18
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"autonomy"). Second, judicial-campaign speech assists voters in selecting
candidates, and candidate discussions of issues assist voters in using
elections to shape the approaches the courts will take in addressing those
issues. Some critics of speech restrictions use this "instrumentalist"
approach to argue that the limitations are bad policy because they promote
unaccountable policymaking by judges, and are unconstitutional because
they make judges less accountable to the voters by keeping voters
uninformed.87
The autonomy rationale is orthodoxy, "dominat[ing] the Supreme
Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence," 88 and White's use of the standard
references to the importance of speech in a democracy and the particular
dangers of allowing governmental restriction of electoral speech 9 is
therefore unsurprising. 90 Nevertheless, speech as individual self-expression
did not figure especially prominently in the majority opinion. 9' Though
Justice Scalia's majority opinion contains some language supportive of the

during election campaigns deserves particular solicitude from courts).
87. Cf.44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that it is never a
legitimate state interest where the government is using its power to keep consumers ignorant in
order to manipulate the market).
88. Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. CoLO.L. REV. 1171, 1171 (1993).
89. See White, 536 U.S. at 781-82.
90. Just as Justice Kennedy's approach in White appeared to be centered on rights of free
expression, so too some lower courts approach some judicial free speech cases as standard
applications of First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802
So. 2d 207, 213-19 (Ala. 2001) (holding a Canon unconstitutional because it was overbroad); In
re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 40-43 (Mich. 2000) (applying lessons from New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), but also noting that elections and electoral speech allow the public
to influence judicial policy).
91. Justice O'Connor's opinion is difficult to classify under this scheme, for her argument
was that judicial elections necessarily create problems ofjudicial impartiality and should therefore
be re-thought. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Of course, such a conclusion only
begs the question of why a state should have to accept issue-based campaigns or private financing
of campaigns if it institutes elections. See Schotland, Myth, Reality, supra note 30, at 663 (naming
the second part of the article "'An Election Is an Election Is an Election': The Mantra That Passed
for Analysis in the Decisions Limiting Canon Provisions"). Though Justice O'Connor never directly
provided an answer, she appears to view restrictions suspiciously when they impinge on the ability
of voters to educate themselves. Cf First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-76 (1978)
(noting that the First Amendment protects interests served by the free exchange of ideas beyond
the speaker's interests). By implying that a state could rid itself of the problems caused by
campaigns if it eliminated elections, she seems to reject the view that speech should be protected
because of the interests of the speaker. See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If
the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."). Thus, while Justice O'Connor appears
lukewarm about the autonomy rationale from a speaker's perspective, she accepts it from a
listener'sby
perspective.
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rights of candidates to speak without restriction,92 it quite clearly leaves
open the possibility that a limitation on campaign speech would be upheld
if the interest supporting the limitation were compelling enough.93 Indeed,
the Court disclaimed a broad reading of the passages invoking the
fundamental First Amendment right to participate in politics, stating that
"[w]e rely on the cases involving speech during elections.., only to make
the obvious point that ... the First Amendment [does not] provide[] less
protection during an election campaign than at other times."94
The instrumentalist rationale for protecting judicial campaigning is
more controversial. Because courts are less representative than the
political branches, but also make important policy choices, liberalization
of restraints on judicial speech helps members of the public affect
judicially crafted policy.95 Ifjudicial candidates can and do discuss issues,
then voters can elect candidates with whom they agree. Judicial decisions
implementing policy will be more likely to be consonant with public
opinion, and the courts will be acting in a less counter-majoritarian
fashion. 96 Furthermore, to the extent that the public begins to see judges as
part of the political process,97 judicial decisions will be evaluated as part
of that process as well. 98
As a consequence of politicizing or demystifying the courts, the power
of the judiciary will be reduced, for the public may be less willing to
respect and obey the decisions of judges whom they believe to be
policymakers. 99 And that potential for altering the power of the courts
92. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 782 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982))
(."It is simply not the function of government to select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in ... a political campaign.' . . . We have never allowed the government to prohibit
candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during an election.").
93. See, e.g., id. at 774-75 (stating the strict scrutiny test); id. at 783 ("[W]e neither assert nor
imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those
for legislative office.").
94. Id. at 783.
95. See id. at 784, 787-88 (noting the similarity in policymaking authority between the
judiciary and the legislature, and calling attention to the "obvious tension" between judicial
elections and campaign speech restrictions).
96. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 56, at 817 n.55 ("Insofar as the common law pronounced
by unelected courts is reflective of the personal policy views of the judges,. . . it appears wholly
oligarchical to subject the populace to judges' policy ideals without imposing an electoral check
on judicial decisions."); Dimino, supra note 30, at 376-78 (noting that voter involvement in the
judiciary is consistent with democratic values).
97. See generally RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION PROCESS (2005) (arguing that the process of staffing the Supreme Court has come to
involve an electoral process, complete with the involvement of interest groups, the media, and the
public).
98. See generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999)
(advocating such a result).
99. See generally Gibson et al., supra note 65.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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defines the opposing camps in the instrumentalist debate over the
constitutionality of the Canons.'00 For those who fear the countermajoritarian exercise of judicial review-perhaps particularly when
untethered to specific constitutional language-the abandonment of the
Canons, such as in White, is attractive because the Canons were adopted
to protect judicial independence and foster acquiescence tojudicial power.
The Canons use free electoral speech instrumentally to discourage courts
from behaving in a counter-majoritarian fashion. Those supportive of
judicial power and policymaking, on the other hand, support the Canons
because they enable the exercise of that power.
Judges supporting speech restrictions proclaim the importance of the
independence of courts, though they rarely acknowledge the costs of such
independence in terms ofjudicial unaccountability.' 0 ' They, like opponents
of judicial elections, maintain a Langdellian view of judging, where the
law, even the common law, is supposed to develop independent of the
public will 1° 2 ... or at least the public is supposed to think so.0 3 Though
the dissenters in White and others who defend the restrictions repeatedly
claim that judges do not implement their preferred policies as law,"° they
make no attempt to prove this dubious claim. Pro-restriction decisions

100. Cf.Burt Neubome, FreeExpressionandtheRehnquistCourt,in THE REHNQUIST COURT:
A RETROSPECTIVE 15,24 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (noting that the Rehnquist Court's approach
to First Amendment cases has lacked any "normative theory"; rather, it views voting "solely as an
instrumental exercise," a method of choosing leaders and shaping policy rather than as a tool for
expression).
101. While most decisions and commentary fall quite clearly into either the free speech or prorestriction camps, some try to find a middle approach. The best example is Buckley v. Ill. Judicial
Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1993), where Judge Posner argued in dicta that judicial
candidates must be granted some freedom to speak, but need not be granted as much protection as
candidates for legislative office.
102. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Political science is, to say the least, skeptical of this argument.
Research has demonstrated that the Justices' policy views are far more predictive of their votes than
are legal factors. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 84 (analyzing what courts do and the
reasons behind judicial policy making); cf. Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism,andJohn Paul
Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 177 (Earl M. Maltz
ed., 2003) (reporting Justice Douglas' recounting of a conversation with Chief Justice Hughes, the
substance of which Douglas found to be "true," in which Douglas was told, "At the constitutional
level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies
the reasons for supporting our predilections."). Lower courts may find their decisions more affected
by legal factors, for they are more constrained in their decisions than are the Supreme Court and
state supreme courts. Nevertheless, nearly everyone recognizes that personal preference plays a role
in decisionmaking at all levels of the judiciary.
103. See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
104. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 809-10 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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rarely acknowledge the role public opinion0 5 and personal preference' 0 6
play in judicial decisions,1"7 and instead rely on the worn protestations that
judges "'shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear
of criticism."" 0 8

The contrasting realism of pro-speech decisions, as in White, consists
of two revelations (or admissions): Judges make policy,0 9 and that policy
is influenced by the philosophies of the judges." 0 Thus, while supporters

105. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Courtas a National
Policy-Maker,6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) ("[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States."); Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way ofSelectingJudges-ExceptAll the Others That
Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267, 272 nn.24-25 (2005) (citing studies discussing the
relationship between public opinion and court decisions); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson,
The LeastDangerousBranchRevisited: New Evidence on Supreme CourtResponsiveness to Public
Preferences,66 J. POL. 1018 (2004) (discussing correlation between popular opinion and Supreme
Court decisions). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2001) ("Social movements have been
one engine driving constitutional evolution as well."); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002
Term-Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 4 (2003) (discussing the role of non-judicial actors in the formulation of constitutional
jurisprudence).
106. See generally, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 84 (analyzing reasons behind judicial
policy making); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of Congress
and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 28 (1997) (accepting that Justices occasionally act strategically,
taking account of other actors' preferences, but arguing that such strategic action is rarely necessary
because of the difficulty other branches face in overturning Court decisions). Other analysts argue
that Justices vote strategically, tempering their policy preferences as necessary to obtain majorities
within the Court and to avoid retribution from the other branches. See generally,e.g., LEE EPSTEIN
& JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (stating that "justices, first and foremost,
wish to see their own policy preferences etched into law"); MURPHY, supra note 84 (considering
the factors that weigh on judges' minds); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic
NationalPolicymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 592 (2001) (stating that "[j]ustices are 'single-minded
seekers of legal policy') (quoting Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme
Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992)); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
OverridingSupreme Court StatutoryInterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 372-89 (1991)
(analyzing the Court's behavior in interpreting statutes); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on
History? Playing the Court/Congress/PresidentCivil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 641-64
(1991) (discussing the Court's role in Civil Rights policy).
107. See Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (speculating the
disasters that might befall the judicial system ifjudicial candidates were to pre-judge cases during
campaigns).
108. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 89 (Fla. 2003) (quoting FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3B(2) (2003)).
109. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (citing Dimino, supra note 30, at 364; Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial
Decisions:A Case Study ofArbitrationLaw in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 594 (2002)).
110. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002) ("We agree that the
distinction between judicial elections and other types of elections has been greatly 22
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of speech restrictions take pains to demonstrate the calamity of adjusting
the law to accommodate public desires, opponents welcome that
possibility. "'The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or
reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political
messages . . . can hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential
features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate of varying
points of view.'"" 1 For proponents ofjudicial free speech, campaigns and
elections are opportunities for the sovereign people to exert control over
their government." 2 For proponents of speech restrictions, campaigns are
"politicians" to manipulate the
chances for sleazy, opportunistic, deceptive
13
prejudices."
their
exploit
or
voters
According to the ABA, these restrictions on political speech and
conduct are in place so that "the dignity appropriate to judicial office" and
"the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary" will be
protected." 4 "Integrity" may be the most direct expression of the legal
profession's attempt to cloak the courts in prestige and denigrate the other
branches. As Professor Bradley Wendel noted, judges "debas[e] ... the
democratic process... as if they might get their robes dirty among the hoipolloi.""' 5 Thus, supporters of restrictions in judicial campaigns contend

exaggerated...."); Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280,294(9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
("One would have to be exceedingly naive not to be aware that a judge's judicial philosophy may
influence his or her votes on important public issues .... ").
111. Geary, 911 F.2d at 284 (alteration in original) (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985)).
112. See White, 416 F.3d at 747-48 ("[C]ourts are involved in the policy process to an extent
that makes election of judges a reasonable alternative to appointment."); id. at 748 (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam)); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31,42-43 (Mich.
2000). As a matter of fact, the ignorance of voters in judicial elections makes it difficult for
elections to exert much influence on the direction ofjudicial policy. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine,
The False Promise of JudicialElections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 559, 562-66 (2002). The
solution to this problem, however, may be to provide voters with more information by loosening
restrictions on judicial campaigning. See, e.g., Anca Cornis-Pop, Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White andthe Announce Clausein Light of Theories ofJudge and Voter Decisionmaking: With
StrategicJudges andRational Voters, the Supreme Court Was Right to Strike Down the Clause,
40 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 123, 160-65 (2004) (discussing the implications of loosening judicial
campaign restrictions); Dimino, supra note 105, at 299-300 (arguing that judicial elections would
be more effective if the "muzzle" were removed from the judges' mouths during elections). One
effect of White, therefore, may be to make judicial elections more meaningful opportunities for
voters to influence the judiciary, for better (ifone is a majoritarian) or worse (if one is a countermajoritarian).
113. See, e.g., Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207, 224 (Ala. 2001)
(Houston, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[c]ore political speech in the 1994 and 1996 Alabama
judicial elections had run amok").
114. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(a) (1990).
115. W. Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial
73, 105 2006
(2001).
S. TEX. L. REv.
Election Campaigns,
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that "[a] judge's ability to render a reasoned decision should not be
clouded by the fear that a challenger can twist words or allege distorted
facts in an election campaign," but other governmental officials must
tolerate precisely that risk.1 16 Judges must be set "aside from the hurly' By prohibiting judges
burly of sometimes unseemly political strife."117
from engaging in politics and justifying that prohibition with an appeal to
integrity, the unmistakable implication is that the political branches lack
the integrity that courts should have. Indeed, the chief fear among
proponents ofjudicial speech and political participation restrictions is that
the public will view judges as mere politicians, which is not very different
from officials in other branches."'
However, integrity is not an end in itself. The restrictions on political
activity are in place, not to make judges feel that they are better people or
are part of a better profession for refraining from politics. Instead, the goal
is power or, as one scholar put it, "the judiciary's moral and political
authority," which instills confidence among the members of the public so
that they will accept judicial rulings as both the embodiment and the
application of "law." '119 The people will vest courts with this undemocratic
power only if judges look like they will exercise it wisely. 2 '
Relatedly, the rhetoric of judges upholding restrictions on judicial
politics is often elitist, evincing contempt for the ignorance of the public
or at least a patronizing dismissal of their concerns. The message is clear:
You do not understand what courts do or how important we are, and you
are just focused on results and locking up criminals; luckily, you have us
to look after you and protect your rights. 2 ' Accordingly, pro-restriction

116. In re Donohoe, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. 1978) (en bane).
117. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: RestraintandLiberty in JudicialEthics, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 1059, 1067 (1996).
118. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that if
judicial candidates "prejudge" cases, "the concept of impartial justice becomes a mockery"); In re
Code of Judicial Conduct, 639 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 2002) (upholding restrictions placed on the
speech ofjudicial candidates); cf. Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to JudicialIndependence by
Criticism of Judges-A ProposedSolution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 737
(1997) ("Much of the judicial hand-wringing about criticism ofjudges has more to do with judicial
vanity than with judicial independence.").
119. Aman McLeod, Ifat FirstYou Don 't Succeed: A CriticalEvaluationofJudicialSelection
Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 509-10 (2005).
120. See, e.g., In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 399-400 (Wash. 1988) (en bane).
121. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564-66 (1965) ("A State may also properly protect
the judicial process from being misjudged in the minds of the public."); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d
1, 7 (N.Y. 2003) ("A campaign pledge to favor one group over another if elected has the additional
deleterious effect of miseducating voters about the role of the judiciary .... Campaign promises
that suggest [that judges can aid particular groups] gravely risk distorting public perception of the
judicial role."). Justice Stewart argued in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.:
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judges and commentators often emphasize the need for "voter education"
efforts, through which the public is supposed to learn'22 the importance of
an impartial and independent judiciary.2 3
Similarly, instrumentalist critics of the restrictions rely on the idea that
the law is manipulable by policy-driven judges because the instrumental
movement is designed to allow the law to change based on the public's
desires. 4 Judges formulate policy, as stated by the White Court, and in a
democracy the voters2 5 should have a role to play in influencing the
policymakers.' 26

A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our
membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little
different from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception
could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our
abiding mission to serve.
416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
122. Cf United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,93-94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting
the "mental reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies or
dispassionate judges").
123. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973,994-95 (2001)
("Public outreach efforts promote judicial independence, because they enable citizens to evaluate
critical attacks on judges and to value judicial independence.... Judicial elections can and should
serve to educate the public about.., the core value of decisional independence."); see also Phyllis
Williams Kotey, Public Financingfor Non-PartisanJudicial Campaigns:ProtectingJudicial
Independence While Ensuring JudicialImpartiality, 38 AKRON L. REv. 597, 615, 620 (2005).
Interestingly, Judge Kotey's prescription recognizes that any such education program must be
"balanced," but it does not see the program itself as unbalanced in promoting judicial
independence. See Kotey, supra,at 615. Interest groups have also taken to using "voter education"
programs, whose balance is questionable. See Emily Heller, Judge Races Get Meaner,NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 25, 2004, at 1 (describing the efforts of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in educating voters
about the need to elect tort reform minded judges).
124. Cf Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("[A]n
agency... may... properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments [as to the meaning of statutes]."); Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule
the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REv. 185, 194 (2004) ("Chevron gives agencies the flexibility to
change and adapt their policies to reflect the current state of affairs and political attitudes.");
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, FederalRules of StatutoryInterpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2085,
2129 (2002) (arguing that Chevron "allows the content of an act of Congress to change with the
changing policy views of the executive branch"); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and AdministrationAfter
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,2103 (1990) (noting that, under Chevron, changes in executive
branch preferences can alter the law).
125. Of course this argument does not go so far as to require states to elect judges; rather, it
requires them to accord rights of free speech "[i]f the State chooses to tap the energy and the
legitimizing power of the democratic process." Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788
(2002).
126. See id. at 784 ("Not only do state-courtjudges possess the power to 'make' common law,
but they have the immense power to shape the States' constitutions as well.... Which is precisely
why theby
election
of Scholarship
state judges became
popular.");
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To illustrate the immense counter-majoritarian power possessed by
courts in the interpretation of common and constitutional law, Justice
Scalia, in White, cited Baker v. State'27 in which the Vermont Supreme
Court required the state to provide marriage-like benefits to same-sex
couples. 28 By pointing to the policymaking power of the courts and
invoking a decision that took sides on one of the most divisive issues of
the day, Justice Scalia invited the public to look not only at the authority
of the courts, but also at the basis on which judges decide cases. The
majority opinion in Baker explicitly compared the judiciary to the other
branches, stating that it was part of the states' "representative government"
and opining that the dissenters "exaggerate[d] the difference between
judicial and legislative elections.' 2 9 Citing Baker in the context of that
discussion says to the country what Justice Scalia has been saying for
years in dissenting opinions: 30 Court decisions are judicially imposed
policy often lacking much connection to the law being "interpreted," and
are little different from the actions of legislatures. 3 '
Recognizing that courts have policymaking power and that they use
that power to advance their visions ofjustice requires looking beneath the
veneer of "judicial impartiality." If judges' personal views do not matter
to the decision of cases, or if judges lack the power to make policy, then
voters have little interest in knowing what judges' views are. But White
acknowledges that judges' personal views do matter, 3 2 and it argues that
voters should have access to that information if the candidates are inclined
to share it.' 33 The dissenters saw judges as the human embodiments of law
and understood public involvement in the judicial process as threatening
to that ideal, precisely because, as fallible government officials, judges
might not always hew to the law when their electoral fortunes rest in the
balance. Thus, both the majority and the dissenters appeared to recognize
between the announce clause and an elected judiciary).
127. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
128. See White, 536 U.S. at 784. Also, Goodridgev. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003), though providing an even greater illustration of Justice Scalia's point by interpreting
the Massachusetts Constitution to require that state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
see id.
at 969-70, was not decided at the time of White. The point is not just that liberal courts are
policymakers, but that courts possess counter-majoritarian policymaking power and they invoke
that power based on their own feelings about what the law should be.
129. White, 536 U.S. at 784.
130. See infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
131. The Court's comparison between the approaches of courts and legislatures, see BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-16 (1921), might suggest that the same
freedom of speech that prevails in legislative campaigns, see Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 4752, 61 (1982); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S; 116, 132-37 (1966), is applicable to judicial ones, see
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320-22 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
132. See White, 536 U.S. at 784 n.12.
133. See id. at 783-84, 783 n.11,787-88.
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that the exercise of First Amendment rights by candidates and voters could
affect the administration of justice.134
Nevertheless, in their rhetoric about the legal process, supporters of
speech restrictions at most grudgingly acknowledge legal realism,
stressing thatjudges must be perceivedas being bound by external law and
deciding cases without an agenda, 135 even if that is inaccurate. 36 Some
134. The realism supporting both the autonomy and self-government approaches to White
suggests that judges are not "employees" of the government whose speech can be restricted as a
condition of employment. Cf United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 588, 595 (1973) (noting that Congress has the power to regulate government
employees' conduct); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413,
1434-41 (1989) (discussing how state employees may sometimes be coerced by the state); William
W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 1439, 1449-51 (1968) (discussing situations in which public employees were forced to
disclose personal political affiliations). It would be anomalous to permit the government as an
employer to restrict an elected official's speech when, after White, he may be in office precisely
because of his ability to speak his views on disputed issues. How much harm can it do to the
judiciary to know that a judge who campaigned based on his views on certain issues continues to
believe them?
135. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 157-58
(Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292-93 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam)
("[W]ithout public confidence, the judicial branch could not function."); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d
1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) ("'[T]he perception of impartiality is as important as actual
impartiality."') (quoting In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 878 (N.Y. 1998) (per curiam)). There is
some indication that the public maintains an unrealistic perception of the judiciary. See SEGAL&
SPAETH, supra note 84, at 8 ("[T]he fairy tale of a discretionless judiciary survives.... [Tihe bulk
of the public simply will not allow themselves to be confused by the fact of judicial policy
making."). Recent wrangling over Senate confirmation of judges may be either the cause or the
effect of an increased public awareness of discretionary judicial policymaking. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 999-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Edith H. Jones, Foreword to Symposium: The Ethics of
JudicialSelection, 43 S. TEx. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001); cf Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press, Supreme Court'sImage Declines as Nomination Battle Looms: Court CriticsNow on
Both Left andRight (June 15, 2005), http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=247
(noting a decline in the positive view of the Supreme Court among conservatives). More likely, it
is interest groups, rather than the disaggregated public, that have figured out both the game and the
stakes. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 219 (rev. ed. 2003) (noting that although interest
groups have played an increased role in the appointment process, "individual citizens have rarely
wielded direct influence over the process"); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 18-19
(1997) (noting the role of interest groups in confirmation hearings); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., The
Lobbying Activities of OrganizedInterests in FederalJudicialNominations, 62 J. POL. 51 (2000)
(discussing the tactics used by interest groups in varying situations); Gregory A. Caldeira & John
R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: OrganizedInterests,Supreme Court Nominations, and United
States Senate, 42 Am. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998) (discussing how interest groups can shape policy);
Christine DeGregorio & Jack E. Rossotti, Campaigningforthe Court:Interest GroupParticipation
in the Bork and Thomas ConfirmationProcesses,in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 215 (Allan J. Cigler
& Burdett A. Loomis eds., 4th ed. 1995) (discussing interest group activities in recent judicial
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pro-restriction writings explicitly tie public perceptions to judicial
power,137 arguing that public respect for judges is necessary to support
"'the justice system upon which the public relies to resolve all manner of
controversy, civil and criminal."" 38 And because nobody knows with any

confirmations); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A SpatialModel ofRoll Call Voting: Senators,Constituents,
Presidents,and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations,36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 105-06
(1992); Peter H. Schuck, Against (andfor)Madison: An Essay in PraiseofFactions, 15 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 553 (1997) (pondering what John Madison would have thought about modem
"factions" or interest groups).
136. See Robert H. Alsdorf, The Soundof Silence: Thoughts ofa Sitting Judge on the Problem
of FreeSpeech and the Judiciaryin a Democracy, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197, 219 (2003) ("I
concede that judges are human. Sometimes we do act on personal beliefs. A pure and unalloyed
allegiance to the law is something of a fiction, but it is the aspiration, the attempt to find the law
that is crucial, however hobbled or imperfect our efforts may sometimes be."); James C. Foster, The
Interplay ofLegitimacy, Elections,and Crocodilesin the Bathtub: Making Sense of Politicization
of Oregon's Appellate Courts, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1313, 1316-17 (2003) (arguing that the
popular perception of judges and law as separate from politics "has the singularly unfortunate
consequence of making judicial independence wholly contingent upon a profound social
misperception of the judicial role"); Farnsworth, supra note 102, at 177-78 (arguing that Justice
Stevens's frequent rejection of legal realism in his opinions stands in marked contrast to the results
in those opinions, which are the applications of his "values" rather than law). Compare,e.g., Geary
v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 290-91 (1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (noting the multitude of interest
groups that seek to influence judges, and arguing that the influence of parties is therefore
unexceptional), with id. at 311-14 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (claiming that the influence of parties
threatens judicial independence).
137. See, e.g., In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) ("The strength of our
judicial system is due in large part to its independence and neutrality... [which] promote public
respect and confidence in our system of justice."); see also Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Judges] occupy an office of trust that is fundamentally
different from that occupied by policymaking officials."); White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]t is the business of legislators and executives to be popular.... [I]t is the business
of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity."); White, 536 U.S. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]he standards for the election of political candidates [should not] apply equally to candidates
for judicial office."); White, 536 U.S. at 802 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he same standards
should not apply to speech in campaigns for judicial and legislative office."); White, 536 U.S. at
803 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that different criteria should apply to the election to judicial
and political office); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court's implicit criticism of the Florida Supreme Court would unwisely damage public
confidence in the judiciary).
138. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting In re Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d 123, 125
(N.Y. 1993) (per curiam)). Mazzei continued, in even more specific language:
A society that empowers Judges to decide the fate of human beings and the
disposition of property has the right to insist upon the highest level of judicial
honesty and integrity. A Judge's conduct that departs from this high standard
erodes the public confidence in our justice system so vital to its effective
functioning.
Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d at 125.
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certainty what might cause public esteem for the courts to suffer,
supporters of restrictions can claim that the Canons are narrowly tailored
to avoid the "appearance" of impropriety,139 even if detractors can refute
claims that independence or integrity is actually threatened by loosening
the restrictions. 4 '
Only by claiming that judges enforce the law-not their policy
supporters of restrictions avoid the counterpreferences'41-,can
maj oritarian critique and the concomitant pressure to make the courts more
accountable. 4 2 Speech restriction supporters are therefore willing to
employ "a normative, idealized view of judges as apolitical disputeresolvers," while opponents of the restrictions are more comfortable using
"a descriptive, post-realist recognition that in practice the judiciary
exercises significant policymaking functions." '43 Within an instrumentalist

139. See, e.g., In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292-93 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (discussing the
importance of preventing political bias and corruption, or the appearance thereof).
140. See In re Campbell, 2004 Annual Report (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 12,
2004) (Emery, C., concurring) ("[M]y colleagues['] ... statement that the Rule is 'narrowly drawn'
because it prohibits political activity 'with certain defined exceptions during a judge's own
campaign for election' is tautological and fails to consider the overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness of the Rule."); In re Farrell, 2004 Annual Report (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct June 24, 2004) (Emery, C., concurring).
141. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Elected judges, no less than
appointed judges, occupy an office of trust that is fundamentally different from that occupied by
policymaking officials.").
142. See, e.g., Thomas L. Jipping, FromLeastDangerousBranch to Most ProfoundLegacy:
The High Stakes in JudicialSelection, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 365, 458 (2000) ("[By inviting
judges] to change the law they apply... [judicial activism] is inconsistent with self-government
and ordered liberty because it takes the lawmaking power away from the people and their elected
representatives and makes the judiciary more powerful than the other branches of government.").
143. Michael Herz, Choosing Between Normative andDescriptive Versions of the Judicial
Role, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 725, 726 (1992); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
We must stop telling stork244 (1930) ("Myth-making and fatherly lies must be abandoned ....
fibs about how law is born and cease even hinting that perhaps there is still some truth in Peter Pan
legends of ajuristic happy hunting ground in a land of legal absolutes."); JEFFREYA. SEGALET AL.,
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 156 (2005).

Contrasted with the majority in White, the dissent made disingenuous arguments, demeaning
the intelligence of even the most vapid citizen. See White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Reverting to the myth of an objective, dispassionate, and impartial judiciary, the dissent averred
that judicial campaigns fundamentally differ from those for policymaking offices, that judges
occupy a special position of trust not possessed by other officials, and that if they do not adhere to
what they said once in office, judicial independence and impartiality would be compromised and
undermined. See id. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Professor Herz notes that Justice Scalia, the author of White, is one of the Justices typically
willing to indulge the fiction that judges do not make law. See Herz, supra, at 765. Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia uses the myth of law-finding for a different purpose than do antimajoritarians. Rather
than arguing that the public must perceive courts as law-finders so that courts are better respected,
Justice Scalia argues that courts should act as if they are law-finders because that properly
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framework, then, one can reach either a speech-protective or a speechrestrictive result, depending on "whether we look to judges as they are or
as they are supposed to be."'"
Nowhere is this difference in approaches more apparent than in the
Court's discussions of the meaning of judicial "impartiality." The White
145
dissenters, like other supporters of judicial speech restrictions,
repeatedly invoked the need for impartiality, arguing that ajudge who had
announced his intention to decide an issue one way or another would
violate due process by sitting on a case involving that issue."4 The Court
rejected this due process argument-an unexceptional result in itself, as no
prior Supreme Court case so much as implied that judges must refrain
from developing positions about legal issues 47-but importantly, it did so
by relying upon a realistic vision of who judges are and how they go about
deciding cases.14' The Court flatly rejected the idea that states would be

constrains their discretion. See id. at 763 (discussing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); Larry Kramer, JudicialAsceticism,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1797 (1991). Indeed, where a law-finder vision of courts impedes his
ability to achieve what he views as the correct result, Justice Scalia rejects it for a more realistic
vision. See Herz, supra,at 754 (discussing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring)). Thus, while Justice Scalia uses traditional imagery ofjudicial omniscience, he does
so with a wink and a nod, and for the purpose of constraining courts rather than emboldening them.
144. Herz, supra note 143, at 744; cf NIXON (Hollywood Pictures 1995) (Nixon, addressing
a portrait of President Kennedy: "When they look at you, they see what they want to be. When they
look at me, they see what they are.").
145. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738,766-76 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Gibson,
J., dissenting); Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 313 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting); In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957,959-60 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d
1287, 1290-91 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) ("[T]he rights ofjudicial candidates and voters are not the
only interests the State must consider."); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam);
Schotland, Myth, Reality, supranote 30, at 665-66; Shepard, supra note 117; see also MINN. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5E (2004) ("'Impartiality' or 'impartial' denotes absence of bias or
prejudice... as well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the
judge."); WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 60.01 (7m) (2004) (same).
146. See White, 536 U.S. at 800-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 813-19 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
147. See Dimino, supranote 30, at 338-46 (arguing that there is no due process right to have
a judge who approaches each issue without preconception). But see In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1,
6-7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (opining that "open-mindedness" ofjudges is a requirement of due
process); In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (citing "due process and
due course of law" as constitutional rights "threat[ened]" by allowing judicial candidates to run
unregulated campaigns).
148. The White majority opined that it is perfectly consistent with due process to have ajudge
elected who knows that his job may depend on deciding a particular case one way or another. See
White, 536 U.S. at 782-83. Some defenders ofrestrictions argue that due process requires an "openminded"judge, and White left open the possibility that open-mindedness was a "desirable" trait for
the judiciary, id. at 778, but the Court then noted that judges regularly make commitments outside
of election campaigns that do not raise any due process concerns, see id. at 779-81.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3

30

Dimino:
Counter-Majoritarian
Power
Judges'
Political
Speech
POLITICAL
SPEECH
AND and
JUDGES'
POWER
COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN

served by having judges come to each case with a mind completely devoid
of preconceptions about how an issue in the case should be decided.' 49 On
the contrary, the Court noted the beneficial aspects of having experienced
judges and lawyers-persons whose careers would necessarily predispose
them to certain views on issues-running for the bench. It was unwise, in
the Court's view, for a state to use speech restrictions to limit judgeships
to those lawyers who have such limited experience so as not to have
required them to take positions on legal issues. 5 Accordingly, the Court,
in evaluating the justifications for judicial speech restrictions, has taken a
realistic view of the judicial selection process, and it understands that
judges have careers that affect the way they see legal problems once on the
bench. This lesson may be translated quite easily into the context of party
involvement and extra-judicial campaign activity. It would hardly escape
the Court's notice that judges have often been active in politics before their
appointments,' 5' and that judges are often well-connected to important
players in the political branches.' 52
The autonomy and instrumentality rationales supporting the result in
White may not always argue for invalidating restrictions on political
conduct, even for those who used instrumentalism as a way of
undermining judicial power. Restrictions on political activity that neither
hinder voters' ability to obtain information nor affect their ability to
influence judicial policy are not impediments to self-governance, and
therefore, may not be opposed by majoritarian instrumentalists. As a
result, the constitutionality of some restrictions on judges' political activity
could depend on the analytical paradigm the Court chooses to employ: the
systemic, instrumental use of free speech to promote self-government or
advancement of free speech as a tool for libertarian self-realization. 53
While an autonomy theory of the First Amendment might call for the

149. See id. at 777-78.
150. See id.(citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum ofRehnquist, J.,
denying motion to recuse himself)).
151. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 757-59 (8th Cir. 2005). See generally,e.g.,
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (new & rev. ed. 1999); SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH

REAGAN (1997); The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
152. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916-17 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia,
J., denying motion to recuse himself).
153. See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330, 339-40 (1993)
(distinguishing between two justifications for protecting free speech: the "instrumentalist"
justification, which "views the freedom of speech as a tool for achieving certain societal
objectives," and the justification "focuse[d] on the constitutive value of speech," which argues for
protecting speech "because it is essential to one's dignity or self-fulfillment, vital aspects of one's
identity") (footnote call numbers omitted).
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invalidation of all content-based restrictions on judicial speech, the
instrumental theory might uphold restrictions that serve other goals.
Perhaps, however, the White Court's realism may indicate that speech
restrictions will continue to be struck down if their defense rests upon an
inaccurate, romanticized vision ofjudging.
Few courts have directly confronted these issues since White, and the
cases that have been decided have reached widely varying results. While
the Eleventh Circuit interpreted White to mean that judges and other
elected officials are protected by the First Amendment to the same
degree, 54 some courts have upheld restrictions on judicial speech that
would be "unthinkable" '5 5 if the restrictions applied to officials in the
political branches.'56 What, then, motivates courts and commentators in
maintaining that the judiciary is simply different, and that the First
Amendment need not mean precisely the same wide-open debate in the
judicial arena as it does elsewhere? The difference in approach can be
explained by a felt need to ensure that courts retain a mystery, an aweinspiring quality inducing unquestioning adherence to judicial decrees.
Ell.

EXPLAINING THE VOTES

On first inspection, it appears peculiar that the four most liberal
Justices voted in White to uphold a restriction on speech, while the five
most conservative voted to strike it down. One might have thought that if
White were to break down on ideological lines, the breakdown would be
precisely the opposite of what occurred, with the conservatives supporting
an exercise of government power and the liberals favoring the individual's
exercise of a fundamental civil liberty. Simplistic visions of liberalism and
conservatism therefore fail to explain the votes in White, and they suggest
that something else is driving the Justices' positions on judicial free
speech.
A. White as a Free-Speech Case
In free-speech cases,'5 7"conservatives" on the Rehnquist Court are not

154. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2002); see also White, 416 F.3d
738, 748-49 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying strict scrutiny, and discussing its use in evaluating all
restrictions of "political speech," including speech about or byjudicial candidates); Spargo v. N.Y.
State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 86-90 (same) (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated
on abstention grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004).
155. Schotland, To the EndangeredSpecies List, supra note 30, at 1400.
156. See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338,347-51
(Me. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1722 (2004); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per
curiam); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
157. See Neuborne, supra note 100, at 15 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court has been very
protective of expression despite the efforts of its namesake); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court
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a monolithic bloc' in favor of government power at the expense of the
individual. ' We might therefore anticipate votes based not on a Justice's
general tendency to uphold exercises of government power, but rather on
a Justice's willingness to tolerate governmental action in free-speech
cases. Professor Eugene Volokh has documented the Justices' votes in
speech cases and has demonstrated that, in order of increasing acceptance
of free-speech claims, the Justices rank as follows: Breyer, Rehnquist,
1 60
O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens, Thomas, Souter, and Kennedy.
Under such an analysis, and assuming White was to be a 5-4 decision one
way or the other, we might expect Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, and
Stevens to vote to strike down the Minnesota announce clause, and we
might expect Justices Breyer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia to uphold
it. Justice Ginsburg, being the median Justice in free-speech cases, could
vote either way without making her vote surprising relative to the positions
of the others.
But as it turned out, the majority was one often seen in high-profile
constitutional decisions outside of the free-speech context: Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
to constitute the majority; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
made an opposing bloc. The votes of Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Souter, Stevens, and Scalia in White are surprising, if one anticipated a
split as typically seen in cases involving free-speech claims.
Taking First Amendment cases in total, rather than analyzing just freespeech cases, is no more helpful in explaining White:
2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4, 130(2001) (discussing the Rehnquist
Court's First Amendment decisions); Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech
Cases, 1994-2000,48 UCLA L. REv. 1191, 1193 (2001); Ernest A. Young, JudicialActivism and
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139, 1211 (2002) (arguing that the Court has been

aggressive in protecting freedom of speech); Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of
Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REv. 51, 85-86 (1994).
158. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 213 (2000)

(noting the influence of"shifting majorities" in freedom-of-expression and freedom-of-association
cases).
159. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 89, 93-96 (2005) (describing Justice Thomas's natural-law-based

libertarianism). Political scientist Richard Brisbin argued that Justice Scalia's jurisprudence was
distinctly conservative, despite occasional flashes of libertarianism, as in Marylandv. Craig,497
U.S. 836 (1990), Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), and Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). See RICHARD A. BRISBIN,
JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCAUA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REvivAL 220-24 (1997).
160. Justices Souter and Thomas were close enough to be tied, but Professor Volokh's study
included White itselfas a data point. See Volokh, supranote 157, appendix (web version), available
at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). Without that case,
Justice Souter would be ranked second-most speech-protective, and Justice Thomas third. In any
event, the important point for present purposes is that both Justices were more protective of speech
than was Justice Ginsburg, the median Justice.
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Percentage of Liberal Decisions in First Amendment Cases
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As the chart above illustrates, the five most conservative Justices on
First Amendment cases, i.e., the five most likely to reject an individual's
First Amendment claim, are the five who voted to sustain such a claim in

White.161 The data are consistent whether one uses the total number of First
Amendment cases a Justice has heard from his or her appointment through
those cases decided in the
the 2001 Term (the first column), 16 2 or16 just
3
column).
second
(the
Terms
1994-2003

161. A "liberal" decision was one supporting the rights-claimant. See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953-2003 TERMS:
DOCUMENTATION 58 (2005), available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
allcourt_codebook.pdf (last visited July 29, 2005).
162. See EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
ORIGINAL

DEVELOPMENTS 486-89 (3d ed. 2003).

163. I gathered this data by using the Supreme Court Judicial Database, limiting the Terms to
1994 and later and the issues to numbers 401-72, excluding memorandum decisions but including
per curiam decisions with or without oral argument, and excluding cases where a Justice's vote was
other than 0 (conservative) or 1 (liberal). The database is accessible at http://www.as.uky.edu/
polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. I compiled this data on March 8, 2005. Limiting the data to the
1994-2003 Terms readily permits a comparison between the Justices because, with few exceptions
owing to recusals, all the Justices heard the same cases. The third column uses more cases for
Justices who have been on the Court longer than Justice Breyer and may therefore yield a more
precise picture of the Justices' views, at the cost of using different data sets for each Justice.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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B. Fearof Electoral Chaos
If one looked at White as a case involving the regulation of the
democratic process rather than one about free-speech rights,' 64 one would
have been further confused by the Justices' votes. In electoral-regulation
cases, the Justices making up the White majority have been those Professor
Richard Pildes has identified as most fearful of an unrestrained electoral
process, and most willing to impose stability on electoral systems. 165 Yet,
in White, those Justices were willing to overturn a fairly stable system and
to require states to tolerate campaigns that states feared would upset the
role of the state judiciary.
Judicial elections add unpredictability to the law, and restrictions on
judicial campaigning are, in part, an effort to limit that unpredictability.
Any system of elections threatens to upset expectations about the
personnel that staff judicial offices, but issue-based campaigning may
upset the stability of the law itself. That is, by encouraging voters to vote
for judges based on their outrage over past decisions, issue-based
campaigns encourage newly elected judges to abandon precedent that is
out of favor with the public."6 To be sure, judicial appointments may be
based on like considerations, and as a result, all public input into the
judicial process may be destructive of stare decisis. 6 Nevertheless, the

164. Cf Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term: Foreword: The
ConstitutionalizationofDemocraticPolitics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28,55-59 (2004) (arguing that the
Court relies too heavily on an individual-rights paradigm when confronting cases dealing with the
regulation of democracy).
165. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy andDisorder,68 U. CHI L. REV. 695, 696-97 (2001).
Thus, in CaliforniaDemocraticPartyv. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 569-70, 586 (2000), Justice Scalia
wrote for a majority that included the White Court plus Justices Souter and Breyer, holding
unconstitutional the use of the "blanket primary," an experiment designed to produce more
moderate nominees for office at the cost of taking control away from the party leaders and giving
it to ordinary voters. Similarly, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,520 U.S. 351, 353-54
(1997), the White majority plus Justice Breyer allowed Minnesota to ban "fusion" candidacies,
which would have supported the viability of third parties at the potential cost of creating confusion
and instability. Finally, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 668-69
(1998), again with the concurrence of the same five Justices and Justice Breyer, permitted the
exclusion of a candidate from a debate who would have added another perspective but who might
have disrupted the order and stability usually prevailing in debates. Based on these cases, one might
have expected Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and possibly Breyer, to have supported restrictions on judicial elections. Yet all except Justice
Breyer voted to strike down the restrictions in White. See also Wendel, supra note 115, at 105-06.
166. See Tillman J. Finley, JudicialSelection in Alaska: JustificationsandProposedCourses
of Reform, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 49, 57 (2003); Elizabeth A. Larkin, JudicialSelection Methods:
JudicialIndependence and PopularDemocracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 78-79 (2001); Thomas
R. Phillips, ElectoralAccountabilityandJudicialIndependence,64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 144 (2003).
105, at 285-86.
167. bySee
supra note Repository,
Published
UFDimino,
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frequency and regularity with which elections are held may make it easier
to organize campaigns to change a body of law than would be the case if
one were forced to wait for the retirement of a life-tenured judge who
makes the difference in a particular issue on an appointed court.
By limiting the topics judicial candidates may discuss, and further
limiting the specificity with which candidates may discuss legal issues, the
Canons limit voters' opportunities to destabilize courts and the law. As a
result, a Justice inclined toward stability would look with favor on speech
restrictions. Yet in White, the five Justices who had in prior cases seen
danger in the chaos of public political participation held that the
Constitution prohibits states from limiting certain campaign speech for the
purpose of promoting stability in judicial elections. 168 Treating White as a
case about controlling the chaotic and confusing aspects of political
campaigns therefore fails to explain the Justices' positions.
A refined version of the Pildes critique may carry more explanatory
power: Justices and others who support restrictions on judicial politics are
not those who would impose stability on an electoral system because of a
general fear of democratic chaos. Rather, they do so because of a fear of
democracy infecting the judiciary. Thus, Justices' beliefs about whether
third parties should be tolerated in legislative elections or whether
innovative ballot-counting strategies should be viewed skeptically do not
predict their approaches to questions of judicial politics. It seems some
Justices are quite accepting of chaos and innovation, as long as the courts
are stable, while others are content with a justice system as chaotic as the
political one. If that is true, it still remains to explain why the Justices
would hold such different views. The following sections argue that the
Justices who want to be removed from democracy are guarding the
counter-majoritarian policymaking authority they possess when they are
unaccountable.
C. Speech Restrictions Muting Callsfor Law and Order
From Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign pledge to appoint "strict
constructionists" who would counter the revolving-prison-door policy of
the Warren Court'6 9 to present-day elections for local judicial office, 7 the
primary issue in appeals to the public about the judiciary-in particular,

168. See James A. Gardner, Forcing States To Be Free: The Emerging Constitutional
GuaranteeofRadicalDemocracy, 35 CONN.L.REV. 1467, 1481-84, 1497 (2003) (arguing that the
Court was wrong to force states to tolerate less-regulated judicial campaigns).
169. See generally, e.g., Dean J. Kotlowski, Trial by Error: Nixon, the Senate, and the
Haynsworth, in THE NIXON PRESIDENCY 71, 71 (Joan Hoff& Dwight Ink eds., 1996).
170. See, e.g., In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (disciplining a
judicial candidate for advocating a tough stance on crime); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80 (Fla.
2003) (same).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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the state judiciary, where the vast majority of criminal cases are tried and
appealed, and where other controversial issues such as abortion and
affirmative action are less frequently litigated-has been criminal
justice.17 ' Criminal issues have the advantages of being emotionally
gripping, of appealing to voters' senses of fear, moralism, and outrage,
with clear good guys and bad guys, and of allowing the voters to visualize
judges as they are often portrayed on television-presiding over criminal
trials. It is much tougher to make voters excited about other aspects of a
judge's job.'72
In criminal cases, the public almost always sides with law
enforcement,173 viewing with suspicion judges who release the guilty on
"technicalities" or impose less-than-maximum sentences. 74 "Everyjudge's
campaign slogan, in advertisements and on billboards, is some variation
of 'tough on crime.' The liberal candidate is the one who advertises:
'Tough but fair."",175 Accordingly, the discussion of issues and policy in
judicial campaigns will disproportionately favor conservatives. Speech

171. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
172. See Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, PartisanJudicialElections: Lessons from
a Bellwether State, 39 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003) (stating that appeals to criminal
justice are often financed by advocates for tort reform because crime has more salience for voters).
173. Cf Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding California's practice of
disenfranchising felons); Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,451 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.)
("[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes
shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these,
the prosecutors who must try them for futher violations, or the judges who are to consider their
cases.").
174. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in JudicialCampaigns, 35 IND. L. REV.
669, 684 (2002) ("In the sample of television ads examined for this Paper, judicial candidates
battled to outdo one another in their tough-on-crime attitudes and their support for and by law
enforcement."); Hans A. Linde, ElectiveJudges: Some ComparativeComments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1995, 2000 (1988) ("Every judge's campaign slogan, in advertisements and on billboards, is some
variation of 'tough on crime.' The liberal candidate is the one who advertises: 'Tough but fair."');
Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1489, 1491
(2001) ("'Tough on crime' is surely the most frequent 'platform' of more than a few judicial
candidates, whether explicit or only 'signaled."'); Abbe Smith, Defense-OrientedJudges, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1483, 1504 (2004) ("[iJudges who enforce the Constitution are vulnerable to an
anti-crime constituency concerned only about the end result of a ruling .. ");Penny J. White,
Legal, Political,and Ethical Hurdles to Applying InternationalHuman Rights Law in the State
Courts of the UnitedStates (andArgumentsfor Scaling Them), 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 937, 959 (2003)
("The politically correct, and astute, judicial platform, has long been 'tough on crime.' Candidates
compete to see who can amass the toughest record on crime as a means of securing a seat on the
bench. Judges at every level have found it advantageous to voice their support for capital
punishment."); see also Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372,397-98 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that an elected judge might be unduly hesitant to disregard
ajury's recommendation of a death sentence); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n. 14 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politicsof
Death:DecidingBetween the Bill ofRights andthe Next Election in CapitalCases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759, 785 (1995) ("Opponents criticize judges for a lack of cruelty.").
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restrictions, then, help liberals by preventing conservatives from tapping
the public's law-and-order attitude.
To test the hypothesis that Justices view speech restrictions as a way
of encouraging the election of defense-oriented judges,176 the Justices'
votes in White were compared with their relative positions in criminal
procedure decisions. As demonstrated in the following table, the results are
quite striking.177 Each of the dissenting Justices in White is a liberal178 in
criminal-procedure cases, voting in favor of the criminal defendant in a
majority of the cases. In contrast, each Justice who voted in the majority
in White is a criminal procedure conservative, voting in favor of the
criminal defendant in fewer than 30% of the cases.
Percentage Liberal Criminal Procedure Decisions

Rehnquist

Stevens

O'Connor
I

Scelia

Kennedy

MAppointment Throegh 2001Term

Souter

Thomas

I 1994-2003 Terms

Ginsburg

Breyer

I

The link between the votes in White and the votes in criminal procedure
cases, and particularly the wide gulf between the most liberal conservative
(Justice O'Connor or Justice Kennedy, with fewer than 30% liberal
criminal procedure votes) and the most conservative liberal (Justice Souter
or Justice Breyer, with more than 50% liberal votes) suggests a

176. See generally Smith, supra note 174.
177. The data in the second column was compiled using the same search criteria used to
analyze the Justices' voting patterns in First Amendment cases, see supranote 163, except that here
the issues are limited to numbers 13-199. The first column is taken from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note
162, at 486-89.
178. In this context, a "liberal" decision is one favoring the person accused of a crime. See
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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relationship between a Justice's views of judicial protection of the rights
of the accused and that Justice's views of the free-speech rights ofjudges.
If the Justices were crudely trying to engineer rules ofjudicial election to
support their criminal justice philosophies, the Justices may have voted
exactly as they did in White. 7 9
Of course, other issue areas beside criminal procedure demonstrate a
similar breakdown. Federalism cases, for example, show the five Justices
in the White majority as the most conservative. 80 But there is no reason to
think that judicial-free-speech cases should be correlated with federalism
cases.' 8 ' The reason criminal procedure cases appear particularly likely to
influence votes on judicial free-speech is because of the established
connection between judicial campaigns and criminal law, specifically in
protecting the power of the judiciary to set free guilty criminals for whom
"technicalities" have not been adequately observed.
It is clear that the connection has not escaped the Justices. Both the
majority and the dissents in White referred to elections' potential effects
on the criminal justice system, 82 and the rights of criminal defendants are
a persistent concern in pro-restriction opinions, in part due to the
preeminent focus on criminal justice during judicial campaigns.8 3 Justice
Scalia's majority opinion acknowledged the fate likely to befall "the judge
who frees Timothy McVeigh,""' while Justice Ginsburg repeatedly
protested the ways unregulated campaigns could affect the "due process
rights"' 85 of litigants "'in both civil and criminal cases.""8 6 Supporters of
restrictions worry that judges who campaign on tough-on-crime platforms
could give "[c]riminal defendants and criminal defense lawyers . . . a

genuine concern that they will not be facing a fair and impartial

179.

Cf THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO

MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 246 (2004) ("The Rehnquist Court's vision of the freedom of
speech is not a partisan vision--the Court defends the right of liberals as well as conservatives to
speak their mind-but it is clearly a conservative vision, as the Court has defended this freedom
primarily in those contexts in which liberal legislators have sought to infringe upon it."); Dimino,
supranote 56, at 819 (arguing that certain judicial-selection systems "represent[] a rigged process
to ensure the continued policy influence of elites who cannot justify their decisions to the
electorate").
180. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 486-89.
181. Indeed, one might expect a correlation in the opposite direction. Insofar as conservatives
in federalism cases promote the authority of state governments over federal power, one might
expect conservatives to support state-enacted speech restrictions over an individual's attempt to
invoke the Federal Constitution.
182. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 771, 782 (2002); id. at 800-01 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting; id. at 809-11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
184. White, 536 U.S. 765 at 782.
185. Id. at 813-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
v. Jerrico,2006
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)).
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tribunal. 187
More importantly, perhaps, disciplinary cases charging judicial
candidates with improper campaigning often involve the candidates'
attempts to broadcast a tough-on-crime image.' 88 The candidate whose
statements were at issue in White itself criticized the Minnesota Supreme
Court concerning both criminal and non-criminal issues. 189 Post-White
decisions in New York' 90 and Florida 9 ' both involved candidates who
were sanctioned for advocating a pro-law enforcement "bias."
A criminal procedure liberal is far more likely to see the protection of
criminal defendants as a "compelling" interest, and might therefore be
more likely to uphold a speech restriction designed to serve that interest
than would a Justice less inclined to agree with the claims of criminal
defendants. It is entirely possible that a Justice's views on criminal
procedure might color his or her views about judicial free speech, even
without directly considering the crass political goal of wanting to elect
judges who agree with the criminal justice positions of the Justice.' 92
In recent years, however, as judicial elections have become
opportunities for referenda on the justice system generally, interest groups
have used the courts as means for influencing policy in myriad subject

187. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 89 (Fla. 2003). Compare the attitude reflected in Kinsey with
the approach of the Tenth Circuit, stating that generally a judge who states a desire to punish
lawbreakers harshly expresses no "bias" justifying recusal: "Judges take an oath to uphold the law;
they are expected to disfavor its violation." United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985,993 n.4 (10th Cir.
1993).
188. See cases cited infra notes 190-91.
189. See White, 536 U.S. at 768 ("crime, welfare, and abortion").
190. See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 2-4 (N.Y. 2003) (sanctioning a judicial candidate for
stating that tough judicial decisions were necessary to deter crime in the locality).
191. See Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 88-89 (reprimanding and fining ajudicial candidate for arguing
that police officers' testimony should be taken seriously and that criminals should be put behind
bars).
192. Data on the state courts that have considered judicial-free-speech issues indicate that a
similar relationship may be present there as well. When the Florida Supreme Court considered In
re Kinsey, Justice Wells dissented from the court's imposition of a penalty on Judge Kinsey for her
campaign tactics. Id. at 100. Justice Wells was identified as a liberal in Professor Langer's statecourt database, but sided with the prosecution in 90.7% of criminal cases in the 2002 and 2003
terms, when the court as a whole ruled for the prosecution in only 73.4% of the cases. Laura
Langer, National Science Foundation CAREER Grant, SES-0092187 Multiple Actors and
Competing Risks in the Policymaking (Unmaking Game) of Judicial Review,
http://www.u.arizona.edu/-Ilanger/NSFSESLANGER.htn (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). A list of
cases on which this observation is based is on file at the FloridaLaw Review.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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areas. 93 Notably, tort liability 94 and the role of religion in society and
government 95 have been salient campaign themes. Perhaps liberals can
make use of this new opportunity to take the focus off crime; 96 a
campaign focused on equality, diversity, abortion, and protecting the
disadvantaged might play well in areas that lean Democratic but that
would elect a Republican to a judgeship if the only available information
indicated that the Republican would keep the community safer. 9 7 Open
campaigns might therefore benefit candidates with different ideologies,
depending on the sentiment of the relevant electorate.
Even if liberals can cut into conservatives' advantages in campaigning,
however, it seems that conservatives do benefit overall from involving the
public in the process of electing judges. After all, the legal community,
98
including the judiciary, is more liberal than the community as a whole,
and for that reason it benefits liberals politically to minimize judicial
accountability to the public and to consolidate the power of judicial
193. See, e.g., Polly Simpson & Sally Weaver, JudicialElections:PollstersWant to Seat FarRight Ideologues, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 16, 2004, at Al 3 (complaining about the Christian
Coalition's use of questionnaires distributed to judicial candidates as a means of publicizing the
candidates' views "on such issues as abortion, homosexuality and school prayer").
194. See generally, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004: How SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS
REACHED A "TIPPING PoIT"-AND HOW TO KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 24-25,
available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf (last visited June 28,
2005) (discussing interest group influence on tort reform); Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and
JudicialSelection, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1483, 1486-89 (2005) (discussing the role ofjudges in the
tort reform debate); David W. Neubauer, Issues in JudicialSelection, 49 LA. B.J. 450, 452 (2002)
(same); Heller, supra note 123, at 1 (discussing how judicial candidates' positions on tort reform
may affect their careers).
195. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ETAL., supra note 194, at 32 (noting the influence of"[t]he politics
of social conservatism" in Alabama); Jim Oliphant, Ruling or Stump Speech?: Anti-Gay Opinion
Sparks Debate on JudicialElections, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at 1 (discussing the religiosity
of the Chief Justice of Alabama).
196. See Schotland, To the EndangeredSpecies List, supra note 30, at 1414 (noting that "the
label 'Republican' is perceived as 'tough on crime,"' giving candidates of that party an advantage
in judicial elections and leading Democrats to propose alternative methods of judicial selection).
197. As a possible example, Max Baer successfully ran for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
campaigning as a pro-choice, pro-death penalty, anti-tort-reform Democrat. See MacKenzie
Carpenter, Should JusticeBe Mute as Well as Blind?:Supreme Court Rivals Disagreeon Speaking
Out, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2003, at A-1.
198. See Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?:Insiderand
OutsiderViews of the Legal Profession,21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835,842-49 (1998) (reporting
that lawyers are socially more liberal than the general public, though they are moderately
conservative on economic issues); Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 661, 664-67
(1985) (reporting data found by indicating that members of the "legal elite" are more civil
libertarian than both the public and the "opinion elite"); Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How
the Tempting ofAmerica Led the People to Rise andBattleforJustice, 69 TEx. L. REv. 759, 769-70
(1991).
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selection within the bar. 199 Under this analysis, criminal justice is just a
subset of a larger class of cases: those where the power of the judiciary is
used to benefit a politically unpopular group.
D. MajoritarianPerspectives on the Supreme Court
Insofar as speech restrictions are designed to provide judges with the
power to act contrary to the desires of majorities, perhaps the votes in
White can be explained by reference to the Justices' views of the proper
role of judges in interpreting law, and the place of the judiciary as a
counter-majoritarian force within a democratic republic. While this claim
is related to the partisan motivations discussed above, there are important
differences. First, Justices who promote greater public involvement in the
judicial process and who fear the excesses of an unaccountable judiciary
can promote democracy without regard to the political ramifications of
such public involvement. And although the majoritarian movement in law
is predominantly conservative,'

it is possible that on some issues public

involvement will turn the judiciary to the left, as was the hope of some
who championed the idea ofjudicial elections in the nineteenth century.2"'
Second, courts have long been noted as the institution in the best position
to protect those individuals who lack access to the political process.20 2
Thus, Justices wishing to maintain courts as a check on legislative excess
may desire more judicial isolation, not because the judiciary makes better
policy choices, but because it is dangerous to leave the legislature with
unchecked power.203 Thus, focusing on judicial power may be a more
useful, nuanced way of analyzing attitudes toward judicial free speech than
the superficial approach of merely looking at a judge's overall
conservatism or liberalism.
Where courts have neither the purse nor the sword, they depend on
public acquiescence for their rulings to have any impact. °4

199. See Dimino, supra note 56, at 811 (arguing that moves to limit the involvement of the
public injudicial selection "favor those interest groups and judges who would lose popular votes").
200. For examples ofconservatism, see BORK, supranote 52, at 117; Graglia, JudicialReview,
supra note 52. But see KRAMER, supra note 69 (arguing that the people should determine for
themselves the meaning of the Constitution, and that the Rehnquist Court has been judicial
supremacist); TUSHNET, supra note 52 (discussing the option of taking the Constitution away from
the Court in support of populist constitutional law wherein judicial interpretation ofthe Constitution
is given no special weight).
201. See Hall, supra note 30, at 341, 345, 348.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra
note 45, at 135.
203. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities .... ").
204. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Legitimacy-specifically, the public willingness to acquiesce in the
rulings of courts 2 5---enables policymaking, and without it the courts are
powerless to stand between the majority and their desires. The White
dissenters' concern with "legitimacy" and "public confidence" thus
reflects a jealous guarding of judicial power. The empirical data bear out
this interpretation: Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, with
Justice Kennedy, have been the most reliable advocates on the Court for
exercising judicial power.2 "6
The term "majoritarian" does not mean simply an unwillingness to
strike down laws. Instead, the majoritarian Justice will refrain from
striking down those laws that have majority support from the voters. There
are several reasons "duly enacted laws do not always carry with them
popular support."20 7 Obviously, most members of the public are unaware

of the existence of laws whose constitutionality is at issue in Supreme
Court cases. Fewer still care very much about whether a particular law
survives judicial review.20 8 A public that is unaware of a law and apathetic
about its continued existence is unlikely to oppose a Court decision
striking it down, and a majoritarian Justice will not feel very conflicted in
joining such a decision.
Furthermore, legislation is often enacted not to placate the majority, but
to appeal to minorities who are particularly concerned about an issue.20 9
Thus, the process of legislative logrolling yields laws opposed mildly by
large portions of the public but actively supported by minorities who use
the intensity of their preferences to influence the legislative process.
Striking down such legislation is hardly counter-majoritarian.
To the extent, however, that one can isolate instances ofjudicial review
of popular legislation, one might be able to assess which Justices are truly
counter-majoritarian, and therefore which might have the greatest fear of
a popularly influenced judiciary. The cases that have concerned judicial
review of direct democracy, i.e., initiatives and referenda, illustrate this
variable. In those cases, where the voting public has already indicated
majority support for the measure, a vote to strike down the law indicates
a willingness to oppose the expressed will of the people. It should,
205. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1828 (2005) (describing "authoritative legitimacy").
206. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
207. Friedman, supra note 34, at 2605. See generally WILLAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY

OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1988) (discussing liberalism, populism, and social choice theories of voting

behavior).
208. See Devins, supra note 69, at 68.
209. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through
StatutoryInterpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 223 (1986) (discussing the
role ofjudicial review in controlling special interest legislation).
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therefore, be a good indicator of a Justice's counter-majoritarian
inclinations.21° Unfortunately, there are too few Supreme Court decisions
involving the constitutionality of initiatives or referenda to be helpful.
Since Justice Breyer's 1994 appointment, there have only been three such
cases.211 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas voted to
strike down only one of the three,212 thus making them the most
maj oritarian Justices on that measure, consistent with the findings in the
rest of this Article. The number of cases, however, is far too small to
enable one to make meaningful conclusions.
Of potentially equal value are the Justices' votes in cases raising issues
of judicial power. If, as this Article has argued, the purpose of speech
restrictions is to increase the power of the judiciary to act against majority
preferences, then those Justices who support judicial power should be
inclined to support the constitutionality of speech restrictions. The
following graphs use two different measures to capture the Justices' beliefs
about judicial power: the number of cases where a Justice votes to strike
down a law as tabulated by Professor Lori Ringhand using political
scientist Harold Spaeth's Supreme Court database,2 13 and my tabulation of
the Justices' votes in "judicial power" cases as classified in the same

210. This is not to say, however, that initiatives or referenda that become law necessarily
represent the majority's desires. The public may be ill-informed about or uninterested in the matter,
and most may not vote at all. See Mihui Pak, The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty in Focus:
JudicialReview oflnitiatives,32 CoLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237,245-46 (1999); Michael Vitiello
& Andrew J. Glendon, Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges
Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1275 (1998) (arguing that the modem initiative process
represents corporate and monied interests, rather than the will of the majority). Nevertheless, as
compared to republican legislative activity, direct democracy is more majoritarian as a general
matter.
211. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (California voter initiative to
make partisan primaries "blanket" primaries); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Colorado
referendum amending state constitution to prohibit actions to protect homosexuals from
discrimination); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Arkansas initiative to
impose term limits on individuals elected to congress by state voters).
212. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 569 (opinion of the Court by Scalia, J., joined by inter alia,
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.).
213. Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism and the Rehnquist Court 19-20 (Aug. 11, 2005)
(unpublised manuscript, available at SSRN:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=765445) (reporting data collected from the Justice-Centered Supreme Court Database,
availableat http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm, and updated through the 2004
Term). Ringhand's dataset is available at http://uklaw.uky.edu/ringhand/ default.aspx. See also
KECK, supra note 170, at 251; cf EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 588-90 (assessing each
Justice's agreement with decisions striking down legislation). Justice Kennedy was the Justice most
likely to agree with the Court when it struck down a law (93.8%). The other Justices ranked as
follows: Stevens (83.3%), Souter (78.6%), O'Connor (75.7%), Thomas (73.8%), Scalia (69.0%),
Ginsburg (63.6%), Breyer (59.3%), and Rehnquist (44.0%). See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 162,
at 588-90.
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database,214 which includes cases adjudicating issues of standing,
justicability, jurisdiction, and the like.215 "Pro-judicial-power decisions"
are ones in which the Justice voted to permit the Court to entertain the
action.2" 6

Combined Votes to Strike Down Federal and State Statutes (1994-2004 Terms)
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The results show no apparent connection between Justices who voted
to strike down the restriction in White and those who regularly vote to
strike down other laws. The Justices most often voting to strike down a
law are Justices Kennedy, followed by Justices Stevens, Thomas, and
Souter (who voted to strike down sixty-two laws), and Justice Scalia, in
that order. Only two of those five, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter,
dissented in White. Perhaps more important, there is very little variation
on this measure between all of the Justices, except Chief Justice
Rehnquist,2" 7 who suggested that measuring their counter-majoritarian

214. The methodology for this tabulation was specified in supranote 163, except that here the
issues were restricted to 701-899.
215. See SPAETH, supra note 161, at 54-56.
216. See id. at 59 (stating that decisions were coded on the basis of whether they were "proexercise of judicial power," "pro-judicial 'activism,' or "pro-judicial review of administrative
action").
217. Cf SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 84, at 415-16 (noting the relative deference Chief
Justice Rehnquist employed in reviewing both "conservative" and "liberal" statutes, though he is
more likely to overturn "liberal laws").
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tendencies by tallying the number of votes to strike down statutes does not
capture any distinctions in their jurisprudence.218
Percentage Pro-Judicial Power Decisions

Rehnquist

Stevens

O'Connor

Scalia

Kennedy

~Apintment Through2001Term

Souter

Thomas

Ginsburg

Breyer

U 1994-2003Terms

There is, however, some relationship between the Justices' votes in
White and their votes in cases raising questions of judicial power. Each of
the Justices who was most supportive of judicial power over the tenure of
the Rehnquist Court (that is, beginning with the appointment of Justice
Breyer) was in the dissent in White. This supports the hypothesis that
because judicial campaign restrictions seek to increase judicial power, the
Justices most accepting of the restrictions will be those who are most
likely to take an expansive view of that power. Data taking into account all
judicial power cases from each Justice's appointment through the 2001
Term 219 present a similar picture, with the notable exception of Justice
Kennedy's position. Using that data, Justice Kennedy is as likely to
support claims ofjudicial power as are Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. This
is not surprising, as Justice Kennedy has earned a reputation as a "judicial
imperialist, '22 being both the Justice most likely to vote to strike down

218. This is not to say, of course, that the Justices exercise judicial review similarly. The
Justices strike down different kinds of laws, but strike down roughly the same number of laws. See
Ringhand, supra note 213, at 26-29.
219. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 486-89.
220. David G. Savage, Taking a Road Less Traveled in the High Court: Justice Kennedy,
Chosen as a Conservative,Has Made Decisions That Echo the Liberal Warren Era, L.A. TIMES,
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statutes and the only Justice more likely than not to vote to strike down
statutes, 22' whether those challenges are from a conservative or a liberal
direction. 222 In any event, Justice Kennedy's voting record suggests that
the Justices' views on judicial power are not the sole determinant of their
positions on judicial free speech. Such a suggestion is consistent with
Justice Kennedy's White concurrence. The concurrence rests on the
autonomy theory of the First Amendment, 223 and it is likely to indicate that
his views of criminal justice and judicial power may matter less in his
analysis of judicial-free-speech issues than such views may matter for
other Justices.
Not only have the Justices' votes shown differing visions of the role of
courts in society, but the content of their writing has done so as well. The
Justices in the White majority most opposed to exercising judicial
power--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-have
been quite willing to criticize the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial
review as inconsistent with democratic self-government224 and have
encouraged political oversight of the courts.225 Chief Justice Rehnquist
Mar. 6, 2005, at A33 (quoting an unidentified "former clerk").
221. See KECK, supra note 179, at 250.
222. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 84, at 412-16.
223. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793-96 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
224. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720-21 (1997) (opinion of the Court
by Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting the immense power the Court wields in judicial review); United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The[] [Framers] left us free to
change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court, which has embarked on a course of
inscribing one after another of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases only the
counter majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law."); Bd. of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Day by day, case
by case, [the Court] is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize."); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("While overreaching by the
Legislative and Executive Branches may result in the sacrifice of individual protections that the
Constitution was designed to secure against action of the State, judicial overreaching may result
in sacrifice of the equally important right of the people to govern themselves."); SUE DAVIS,
JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-26 (1989); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of
a Living Constitution,54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704-06 (1976) (discussing the role of contemporary
value judgments in a democratic society); see also Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the
United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986) ("The
permanence of the Constitution has been weakened.").
225. Chief Justice Rehnquist, having participated in deliberations concerning President
Nixon's nominations to the Supreme Court, see JOHN W. DEAN: THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 15-16, 19,
27-28, 155 (2001), later argued that it was "both normal and desirable" for the President to try to
"pack" the courts with judges fitting his (and, by hypothesis, the people's) judicial philosophy, see
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 236 (1987); see also South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Overrulings of precedent
rarely occur without a change in the Court's personnel."); REHNQUIST, supra,at 319 (arguing that
the Constitution provides for political input into the composition of Article III courts and the Article
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went so far as to argue that judges who impose their policy judgments
under the guise of constitutional interpretation "either ought to stand for
reelection on occasion, or their terms should expire and they should be
allowed to continue serving only if reappointed by a popularly elected
'
Chief Executive and confirmed by a popularly elected Senate."226
Further, the Court's majoritarians have suggested that the views of the
people on constitutional matters are as likely to be correct as the views of
judges, undercutting the argument that independence is necessary to
achieve a proper interpretation of the Constitution.227 Justice Scalia, the
author of the Court's opinion in White, is more explicit than any other
member of the Court in charging the judiciary with refusing to be bound
by anything other than its own desires. 22 ' He has given up on the vision of
judicial independence as a tool to protect the rule of law, and favors
limiting that independence as a second-best alternative to giving courts
free rein to do what they may in the name of the law. As the Justice has
opined, "'I am not happy about the intrusion of politics into the judicial
appointment process.... Frankly, however, I 229
prefer it to the alternative,
which is government by judicial aristocracy.'

Each characteristic example of Justice Scalia's conservative-populist
rhetoric, in which he is oftenjoined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, stems from an abiding distrust of the judiciary's capacity as a
lawmaking body. PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
233
Casey,230 Lee v. Weisman,23 I Romer v. Evans,232 Stenberg v. Carhart,
V amendment process because the Framers were "wary of unchecked power in the judiciary as in
all other branches of government").
Chief Justice Rehnquist defended judicial independence, going so far as to refer to it as one of
the "crown jewels" of the constitutional structure, William H. Rehnquist, The Futureof the Federal
Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REV.263, 274 (1996), but, in his words, "[t]his simply shows that there is a
wrong way and a right way to go about putting a popular imprint on the federal judiciary," id. at
273.
226. Rehnquist, supra note 224, at 698.
227. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't ofHealth, 497 U.S. 261,293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)
("[T]he point at which life becomes 'worthless,' and the point at which the means necessary to
preserve it become 'extraordinary' or 'inappropriate,' are neither set forth in the Constitution nor
known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at
random from the Kansas City telephone directory."); REHNQUIST, supranote 225, at 317 (arguing
that viewing the Court as "the conscience of the country ... has a considerable potential for
mischief' when used to place into law the "personal moral judgments" of "individual judges").
228. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1217 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465, 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court'
constitutional jurisprudence... alternately creates rights that the Constitution does not contain and
denies rights that it does.").
229. See Warren Richey, OneJustice'sVision ofRole ofthe Courts, CHRISTIAN SCI.MONITOR,
Nov. 16, 2004, at 1.
230. 505 U.S. 833, 996-1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
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Atkins v. Virginia,234 and Lawrence v. Texas,235 to name a few cases, all
contain language critical not merely of the Court's conclusions, but also
of the Court's use of its judicial review power. 23 6 As such, they indicate
that those Justices see judicial power as dangerous in the wrong hands, and
that the alternative-relatively unconstrained majoritarianism-may be
preferable.237
dissenting in part).
231. 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court has no business imposing
upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this
institution are selected .... ); id. at 651-53 (arguing that the Court's decision was and is "an act,
not of judicial judgment, but of political will").
233. 530 U.S. 914, 954-55 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. 536 U.S. 304,338 (2002) ("Seldom has an opinion ofthis Court rested so obviously upon
nothing but the personal views of its Members."); id. at 348-52.
235. 539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (2003).
236. See generally SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S WITTIEST, MOST
OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004) (reprinting some of the Justice's most noteworthy
dissents); Michael Frost, JusticeScalia'sRhetoric ofDissent:A Greco-RomanAnalysis of Scalia's
Advocacy in the VAI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167 (2002) (analyzing the rhetorical language in Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinions).
237. To be sure, there may be alternate explanations for the rhetoric in Justice Scalia's separate
opinions. His personality, rather than a majoritarian philosophy, may cause the opinions to be more
personal than they would otherwise be. Thus, other Justices' relatively restrained use of such
rhetoric may not indicate that Justice Scalia is much more majoritarian than they are. Still, it seems
important that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who often use judicial power in such a way as to
evoke the ire of Justice Scalia, typically decline to join Justice Scalia's separate opinions when he
is his most bombastic in criticizing the Court's free-wheeling approach to judicial review, even
when they agree with him as to the outcome of the case. Additionally, criticizing the Court is by
no means rare in dissenting opinions, although the majoritarian rhetoric arguably is subtly different
from run-of-the-mill dissents.
I attempted to measure empirically the degree of anti-Court rhetoric in Supreme Court opinions,
but achieved only inconclusive results. Hypothesizing that the Justices I have identified as most
majoritarian would criticize the Court for disregarding the rule of law, see John C. Eastman,
JudicialReview of UnenumeratedRights: Does Marbury'sHoldingApply in a Post-Warren Court
World?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713, 740 (2005) ("A 'Rule of Law' that is itself lawless is not
the kind of 'law' that generates (or deserves) respect."); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the
Constitution,61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 985 (1987), and that the counter-majoritarian Justices would
hold out the courts as safeguarding the rule of law, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 158 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Farnsworth, supra note 102, at 170; Randall T. Shepard, Judicial
Independence: Telephone Justice,Pandering,andJudges Who Speak out ofSchool, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 811, 811 (2002), I asked my research assistant to collect all the decisions in which one
or more Supreme Court opinions used the term "rule of law" and to categorize the use of the term
as pro-Court or anti-Court. She found twenty-one pro-Court uses, and sixteen anti-Court ones. We
then tallied the Justices who joined each opinion using the term and calculated the percentage of
each Justice's uses that were pro-Court and anti-Court. From most anti-Court to most pro-Court,
the Justices (with pro-Court percentages in parentheses) were: Scalia (50%), Thomas (57%), Souter
(64%), Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer (67%), Rehnquist and O'Connor (75%), and Kennedy
based is on file at the FloridaLaw Review.
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The majoritarian language in Justice Scalia's opinions accompanies his
reliance on originalism, which he views as a way of preventing judges
from changing the Constitution to suit their own preferences. But
majoritarianism-deference to current public majorities-and
originalism----enforcement of the policy decisions of past majorities-are
sometimes in conflict.238 Both, however, reflect a distrust of elite judicial
policymaking; therefore, it would not be surprising to see majoritarian
rhetoric in an originalist argument where the originalist is accusing other
judges of making policy decisions supported neither in the Constitution
nor in current majority preferences.239 It is interesting in this context to
note that the Justices who believe most fervently in a static conception of
law are the ones in White who saw no compelling interest in maintaining
the insulation of the judiciary. One might expect Justices for whom the law
is fixed to relish the ability to apply that fixed constitutional meaning
irrespective of current preferences. Stated differently, Justices who believe
that law is unchanging are counter-majoritarians in that they reject current
majority preferences in favor of law established by prior generations'
majorities.
Yet in spite of originalists' willingness to oppose current majorities,
they are willing to tolerate public influence on the law to avoid an even
greater harm: judges' policy preferences, rather than the public's, shaping
the law's evolving content. White therefore suggests that originalists see
three possible ways in which adjudication proceeds: (1) independent courts
apply a fixed conception of law, occasionally in opposition to current
majority preferences; (2) accountable courts apply an evolving concept of
law, interpreting the law in accordance with public preferences; and (3)
independent courts apply an evolving concept of law, interpreting the law
in accordance with (other) judges' own preferences. Originalists forsook
the first way in White, either because they viewed it as unrealistic to hope
that judges will faithfully interpret the law without looking to their own
policy preferences, or because those areas where originalism still holds
sway (statutory construction and some separation-of-powers issues, for
example) are unlikely to be significant in public discussions of judicial
performance. On issues important to the public-crime, capital
punishment, abortion, affirmative action, gay rights-originalist arguments
are overwhelmingly heard in dissent. It makes sense, therefore, that the
originalists would see the effective choice presented in White as between
judicial and majoritarian policymaking, and that they would prefer the
latter.
238. See generallyKECK, supranote 179 (noting the conflict between conservatives who favor
originalism, those who favor deregulation, and those who favor broad deference to legislatures).
239. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for "contradict[ing] both historical fact and current practice").
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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The White dissenters, on the other hand, have praised courts' ability to
advance the fortunes of individuals and groups lacking access to the
political process.2z4 They see courts as agents of change, policymakers sub
silentio who can improve on the law and push the nation to fulfill
aspirations of equality and liberty only if unconstrained by the
unenlightened public's desires. 24 ' Justice Ginsburg, for example, accepts
moderate, incremental change in policy, not because moderation is what
she desires, but because moderate change will be politically acceptable. 42
This analysis suggests that, though visions of judicial power may
motivate most of the Justices' positions on judicial free speech, it
apparently does not so influence the Justices in the middle-particularly
Justice Kennedy. He holds an expansive conception ofjudicial power and
has refrained from joining (indeed, he is the object of) 2 43 much of the
majoritarian anti-court rhetoric. Moreover, both he and Justice O'Connor
joined with Justice Souter in Casey to write the most self-conscious plea
for legitimacy and power in the Court's history. 2 " Thus, the Justices who
240. Justice Ginsburg has praised the independence of the federal judiciary because it enables
the courts to stand in the way of majoritarian desires-to protect those who "'are helpless, weak,
outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."'
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on JudicialIndependence, 20 U. HAw. L. REv. 603, 608-09
(1998) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
241. Justice Breyer has argued against using the First Amendment to promote individual selfexpression at the expense of other values. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Stephen Breyer, OurDemocratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 245, 250-256 (2002). It is therefore not surprising that he would see fit to allow states to
restrict speech to promote counter-majoritarian judicial power.
242. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208
(1992) ("[W]ithout taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain, the
Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a green light for a social
change."). Thus, Justice Ginsburg has criticized the Court's "breathtaking" decision in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), because the forceful way in which the Court articulated the abortion
right stalled the legislative process, which had been lessening restrictions on abortion until Roe
provoked "a well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement [which] rallied and succeeded, for
a considerable time, in turning the legislative tide in the opposite direction." Ginsburg, supra,at
1198, 1205.
243. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There
is no cause for anyone who believes in Casey to feel betrayed by this outcome."); id. at 961
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("A review of Casey demonstrates the legitimacy of these policies."); id.
at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding stems from . ..misinterpretation of
Casey .. ");Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Justice Kennedy's separate opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), "of course" was
inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Weisman); id. at 636 (referring to Justice
Kennedy's "coercion" analysis as "psychology practiced by amateurs" and "not to put too fine a
point on it, incoherent").
244. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992); Cooper v.
U.S.Law
1, 18-20
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see the Canons as limiting the public's influence over the judiciary may
uphold them or strike them down depending on whether they see that
influence as positive or negative; Justices who see the Canons as limiting
the search for truth and individual self-expression may strike them down
regardless of their views of counter-majoritarian policymaking.
Putting these considerations together, the following hypothesis
develops: Judges are willing to grant First Amendment protection to
political speech by judges if either they view the claim of free speech
through an individual-rights, autonomy-focused paradigm, under which
the government is not permitted to limit the freedoms of speech and
thought when the goal is to encourage support for the government, or they
view speech restrictions as an undemocratic attempt to enable elite
policymaking by the judiciary. Judges are unwilling to grant First
Amendment protection to political speech by judges if they view that
speech as threatening judicial independence and if, for the most part, they
consider independence beneficial in protecting the rights of the
unpopular.245
IV. THE COMPETING INTERESTS

Restrictions on the political activity of judges and judicial candidates
fall into two categories: restrictions on the ways judges conduct their own
campaigns, and restrictions on the involvement of judges in politics
generally or in others' campaigns. The interests served by each type of
restriction are somewhat different, and as a result, judicial review of one
type may not indicate whether all restrictions on political activity are
constitutional.
A. RestrictingJudicialCampaigns andLimiting Public Influence
on JudicialPolicy
In sharp contrast to the distance most federal judges put between

245. I do not believe, nor do I claim, that this division will predict every vote. As an example
of the limitations of this analysis, Judge Reinhardt, considered to be one of the most liberal federal
appellate judges, concurred in a decision striking down a law forbidding parties from endorsing
candidates in non-partisan races, including judicial ones. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 286
(9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). His opinion contained the traditional First Amendment arguments
bespeaking an autonomy approach to the issue, see id. at 286, 289-90 (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
as did the majority opinion, see Geary, 911 F.2d at 283-86, but it also contained reference to the
ability of voters to base their votes on the policy positions ofjudicial candidates, see id. at 294-95
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), a surprising rhetorical move for a liberal. See also Stephen Reinhardt,
JudicialSpeech andthe OpenJudiciary,28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 805,807-09,810 (1995) (discussing
judges' rights to speak about the judiciary outside of opinions, and noting that rules suppressing
speech are founded on a myth of a "godlike" judiciary).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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themselves and electoral politics,24 6 judges in thirty-nine states stand for
some form of popular election,247 and ten of those states elect judges on
partisan ballots.24 8 As a result, state-court judges often make less of an
effort to separate themselves from politics and parties than do their federal
counterparts, 249 and critics charge that the line between law and politics
has been blurred by elections that force judges to become politicians. 250 To
246. In recent years, blatantly political remarks by a federal judge are quite rare-so much so
that when such remarks do occur, they make national news. District Judge Alcee Hastings's
numerous comments about the "racism" of President Reagan and advocacy for the Reverend Jesse
Jackson, see Talbot D'Alemberte, Searchingfor the Limits of JudicialFree Speech, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 611, 611-14 (1987), and Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi's recent statements comparing the
selection of President George W. Bush in 2000 to the installations of Adolf Hitler and Benito
Mussolini (all the while purporting not to comment on "what some have said is the extraordinary
record of incompetence of this administration") have caused stirs precisely because they are so
aberrant. See Josh Gerstein, Audience Gasps as Judge Likens Election of Bush to Rise of IlDuce,
N.Y. SUN, June 21, 2004, at 1. Calabresi's "remarks were met with rousing applause from the
hundreds of lawyers and law students in attendance" at the American Constitution Society event.
Id.
247. See supra note 1.
248. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supranote 1, at 209-11. The ten states are
Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and West Virginia. Id.
249. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Coughlan, No. 1:04CV1 612 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14,2004) (discussing
a complaint against a judge for disclosing his partisan affiliation in campaign advertisements);
Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated
on abstentiongrounds,351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,541 U.S. 1085 (2004) (discussing
a state judge's methods of campaigning for himself and participation in rallys for candidate Bush
during the 2000 election controversy in Florida); Steve Schultze & Richard P. Jones, Where Does
High Court Gofrom Here?:Impact ofRace Between AbrahamsonandRose Tough to Call,Experts
Say, J. SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Apr. 4, 1999, available at http://www.jsonline.com/
election99/news/0404supreme.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (reporting that four incumbent
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices publicly endorsed the candidacy of a challenger to incumbent
Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson); Sam Skolnik, Outspoken Justice is Ripe Targetfor Rivals:
Some See Bias in LibertarianLeanings of "The GreatDissenter,"SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Sept. 7, 2004, at B I; Judge Withdraws Decision to Block Nader from Ballot,
http://www.thenewmexicochannel.com/politics/3744807/detail.html (last visited Sept. 20,2004).
New Mexico Judge Wendy York, who held that third-party presidential candidate Ralph Nader
should be barred from that state's ballot, withdrew her opinion and recused herself owing to
controversy generated by her being a financial contributor to the Kerry campaign. She admitted no
bias, but withdrew out of a concern that her decision created the appearance of impropriety. See
Judge Withdraws Decision, supra.
250. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes ofPopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906) (arguing that the involvement ofjudges with politics
diminishes the respect given them); Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, supra note 30
(noting ways that the judiciary is unique from other branches); Katie A. Whitehead, Loose Lips Sink
Ships: The Implicationsofa LiberalPolicyRestrictingJudicialSpeech, 28 S.ILL. U. L.J. 159, 170
(2003) (bemoaning the injection of "judicial politics" into "the election process"); Politiciansin
Judges 'Robes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at A24 (noting that judges must walk athin line to avoid
being too political).
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stem this concern, state canons of judicial ethics have regulated judicial
typically have been "boring, low
campaigning, resulting in contests that 251
participation, minimally useful affairs."
Until the 1990s, state regulation of the political speech of judges
largely went unchallenged, and it was unclear whether judges-even
elected judges-had any First Amendment right to speak on political
matters or otherwise participate in politics besides simply appearing on the
ballot. 2 White changed that by invalidating Minnesota's crude attempt to
prohibit its judicial candidates from discussing any disputed legal or
political issue.253 Far from settling the issue, however, White provoked new
debate among academics, judges, and states about how best to achieve the
goals of judicial independence, accountability, and free speech. 4
Even after White, similar restrictions persist, each of which shapes the

251. Reynolds Cafferata, Note, A Proposalforan EmpiricalInterpretationof Canon 5, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1674 (1992).
252. Though the announce clause challenged in White had not been the subject of a Supreme
Court case until 2002, the ABA changed it in 1990 over concerns that it impinged on free speech.
See Max Minzner, Gagged but Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing Judicial
Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC L. REv. 209, 214 (1999); Cafferata, supra note 251, at 1646-48;
Adam R. Long, Note, Keeping Mud off the Bench: The First Amendment and Regulation of
Candidates'Falseor MisleadingStatements in JudicialElections,51 DUKE L.J. 787, 797 (2001).
The current version bars judicial campaign "pledges, promises [and] commitments," but at least in
theory allows some discussion of issues. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
253. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770-74 (2002) (describing the breadth of
the prohibition).
254. I have been privileged to take part in this dialogue. See Dimino, supra note 30. Other
notable contributions include Alsdorf, supra note 136; Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualificationor
Suppression: Due Process and the Response to Judicial CampaignSpeech, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
563 (2004); Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to HarmfulSpeech?: Judicial
ElectionsAfter Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262 (2003); Matthew D.
Besser, Note, May I Be Recused?: The Tension Between Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197 (2003); see also The Way
Forward:Lessons from the NationalSymposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649 (2002) (describing the symposium's attempt to strike a balance
between First Amendment rights and the right to an impartial judiciary), as well as the individual
contributions to that symposium, which was held prior to the Court's decision in White. Missouri
quickly changed its ethical Canon to indicate that although judges have the First Amendment right
to announce their views, "[r]ecusal, or other remedial action, may... be required of any judge in
cases that involve an issue about which the judge has announced his or her views." See In re
Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5B(1 )(c) Campaign Conduct (July 18,2002), availableat http://
www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf. The ABA similarly mandates that judges recuse themselves
when prior statements have committed them or have appeared to commit them with respect to an
issue in a case. See MODELCODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(f) (2003) (requiring recusal
if ajudge has made biased public statements regarding an issue or controversy in the proceedings);
Matthew J. Medina, Note, The Constitutionalityof the 2003 Revisions to Canon 3(E) of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (2004) (describing the adoption of
amendments mandating disqualifications based on prior statements).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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scope of permissible debate in judicial elections. Specifically, the ABA
Model Code requires that judicial candidates "not ...make pledges,
promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial
' or "knowingly
performance of the adjudicative duties of the office"255
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact
' Judicial candidates "shall not
concerning the candidate or an opponent." 256
personally solicit or accept campaign contributions or personally solicit
' and the candidate's campaign committee is
publicly stated support,"257
limited to soliciting such support only during a specified window
surrounding the election.258 Contributions are limited in amount259 and
must be reported.26 ° Finally, the catch-all restriction requires candidates to
"m-raintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner
consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independence of the
judiciary. "261
The proffered objective of restricting judicial campaign speech is the
promotion of the "independence" and "impartiality" of the judiciary and
the "appearance" of both "independence" and "impartiality., 262 As the
White majority noted, independence and impartiality in this context turn
out to be the same thing: the isolation of the judiciary from the desires of
the public. 263 A judge who knows that his job depends on being
acceptable to the median voter will not be able to decide cases

255. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2003). Forty-three states have
a limitation prohibiting pledges, promises, commitments, or all three. See Matthew J. Streb,
JudicialElections: A Different Standardfor the Rulemakers?, in LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS:
THE RULES OF THE GAME 171, 181 (MatthewJ. Streb ed., 2005). The charts created by Streb appear
to be inaccurate in two respects. First, New Hampshire does have a pledges, promises, and
commitments clause. N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(10), available at
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-38.htm. Second, North Carolina does not have a pledges
and promises clause. See generally N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, available at
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/aoc/NCJudicialCode.pdf. The states that appear to have no
comparable prohibition are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Virginia. See Streb, supra, at 181. See generallyN.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
availableat http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/aoc/NCJudicialCode.pdf. Of those states, only
North Carolina elects judges. See CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; HAW. CONST.
art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, art. IX; N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16;
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
256. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2003).
257. Id. Canon 5C(2).
258. See id.
259. See id. Canon 5C(3).
260. See id. Canon 5C(4).
261. Id. Canon 5A(3).
262. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (discussing the meaning
of impartiality in order to determine whether it constituted a compelling state interest).
263. by
Id.UF
at Law
775 n.6.
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independent of public opinion.2" And a judge who has discussed legal
issues in an attempt to win votes will be inclined, all other things equal, to
act in accordance with whatever commitments he has made while
campaigning. 265 He will, therefore, not approach every case neutrally; he
will be inclined to favor whatever side offers the argument he supported
while running for office. Only if judicial electioneering is neutered by
prohibiting the discussion of issues can elections co-exist with these ideals
of independence and impartiality.
According to the theory behind judicial campaign speech restrictions,
a judge who cannot campaign based on issues will not pledge himself to
one side of a controversy, and while in office he will be free to exercise
independent judgment, not fearing retaliation at the ballot box so long as
his challenger is effectively prevented from criticizing his decisions.
Whether in fact impending elections influence judicial decisionmaking (as
empirical data suggest they do),2 66 or whether speech restrictions counter
this influence (which is unclear),26 7 the ethical Canons' goal is to reduce
268
public influence on the making of judicial policy.
The interest in maintaining the appearance of independence and
264. See, e.g., id. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (pointing out that judges subject to
regular elections are likely to feel they have a personal stake in the outcome of every political case);
William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform
Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1090 (2004) (arguing that fear of being ousted may drivejudges
to vote against political minorities).
265. See White, 536 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. See Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, State Supreme Courts and Their Environments:
Avenues to General Theories of Judicial Choice, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INST1TUTIONALIST APPROACHES 284 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Melinda
Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections andJudicialPoliticsin the American States, 23
AM. POL. Q. 485, 495-97 (1995); Melinda Gann Hall, ElectoralPoliticsand Strategic Voting in
State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 442-44 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Toward
an IntegratedModel ofJudicialVoting Behavior,20 AM. POL. Q. 147, 151, 164-65 (1992); Joseph
R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint:A Judge's Perspectiveon JudicialRetention
Elections,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988). But see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
ConstitutionalLitigation in Federaland State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of JudicialParity,
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 230-31 (1983) (suggesting that judicial elections are unlikely to
influence judges).
267. See Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model of
Judgingand Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1305, 1326, 1335 (1997)
(noting that because the public rarely can use elections to make judges accountable for unpopular
decisions, judges are free to "vote their values, that is, act independently, most of the time, whether
they are elected or appointed"); cf Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and
JudicialBehavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 313 (1994) (suggesting that judges adjust their behavior
in fear of electoral defeat even if defeat is "highly unlikely").
268. It is for that reason that White saw the announce clause as presenting an "obvious
tension" with a system of judicial elections. 536 U.S. at 787; see also id. at 792 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the potential for judicial bias is intrinsic to the state's continuing practice
of popularly electing judges).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/3
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impartiality refers to the perception of a judge being immune from public
opinion and other factors besides the law, regardless of whether the judge
was actually influenced. This interest is important, it is alleged, because
if society believes that judges are merely politicians, courts will lose
legitimacy and the people will be less inclined to accept judicial decisions
unquestioningly.2 69 The Canons' concern with maintaining a stately
judicial image so as to maintain judicial legitimacy and power, though not
a substantial concern in White,2 70 figures especially prominently in an
analysis of restrictions on judges' political activity outside their own
campaigns.
B. RestrictingJudicialParticipationin Non-JudicialCampaigns and
ProtectingPublic Esteem for the Judiciary
State and federal codes ofjudicial ethics (as well as the ABA's Model
Code of Judicial Conduct) require both elected and appointed judges to
refrain from political activity, including matters relating to party politics
and campaigns for non-judicial public office. These Canons include
requirements that a judge not "act as a leader or hold an office in a
political organization,, 27 "publicly endorse or publicly oppose another
candidate for public office, 2 72 "make speeches on behalf of a political
2741i or "solicit
organization, ",273 "attend political gatherings, ,at
funds for, pay
an assessment to or make a contribution to a political organization or
candidate., 27 Furthermore, "[a] judge shall resign from judicial office
upon becoming a candidate for a non-judicial office either in a primary or
in a general election,"276 and may not engage in any political activity not
expressly authorized by the Canons or law.277
Whereas restrictions
on judicial campaigns seek to

269. See supra notes 34-37, 47-50, 198-99 and accompanying text.
270. White acknowledged that one purported interest served by the announce clause was
"preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary," which was claimed to be
compelling because "it preserves public confidence in the judiciary." 536 U.S. at 775. The Court
held that the clause was not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling interest in "impartiality," and
that protecting the appearance of a non-compelling goal was itself non-compelling. Id. at 776. The
Court did not explicitly consider whether maintaining public confidence could be a compelling
interest apart from a connection to an ill-defined sense of "impartiality." See id.
271. MODEL CODE OF JUDICLAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(1)(a) (2003).
272. Id. Canon 5A(1)(b).
273. Id. Canon 5A(1)(c).
274. Id. Canon 5A(1)(d).
275. Id. Canon 5A(1)(e).
276. Id. Canon 5A(2); see Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295,306 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (upholding the Louisiana version of this provision).
277.byMODEL
CODE OF JUDICLAL CONDUCT Canon 5D (2003).
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' by limiting voters' ability to
"undermin[e] . . . judicial elections,"278
influence judicial policy through elections, the principal object of
restrictions on judges' participation in others' campaigns is different. A
judge who wishes to participate in politics is not susceptible to the same
pressures as is a would-be judge seeking election. In judicial campaigns,
free speech threatens to make judges servants of the majority. In nonjudicial campaigns, the judge already has his job, and he seeks no public
approval for his political involvement; he seeks only to persuade his fellow
voters and provide support for his personal or ideological allies.
Accordingly, non-judicial campaign restrictions do almost nothing to
protect judges from public influence. 79 Instead, they attempt to maintain
public esteem for the courts by separating them from the dirty business of
politics. Statements by judges that might lead the public to question the
non-political nature of the judiciary are condemned; privately expressed
sentiment in support or opposition to a politician is not. Holding a party
leadership position is prohibited; being a member of a party is not.
Endorsing a candidate for executive or legislative office is prohibited;
voting for that candidate is not. These restrictions are constitutional only
if there is a compelling interest to make the public believe (falsely) that the
judiciary is non-political. 8 ° Particularly after White demonstrated a
willingness to look realistically at the judiciary and see the human element
to judging, such an interest would appear anything but compelling.
The theory behind the Canons is one of appearances: The legitimacy
" ' judicial power depends
of courts depends on public respect for judges;28
282
on legitimacy; and justice often depends on courts having the power to
make unpopular rulings.283 Ifjudges lose their neutrality by becoming part

278. See White, 536 U.S. at 782.
279. See In re Farrell, 2004 Annual Report (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 24, 2004)
(Emery, C., concurring) ("If safeguarding impartiality really is the goal, then there cannot possibly
be any principled basis for prohibiting judges from contributing to or campaigning on behalf of
others, but allowing them to raise money in this manner and campaign for themselves.").
280. Cf Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons,andStareDecisis: A Response,
40 AM. J. POL. SC. 1064, 1080 (1996).
281. See Nancy Gertner, To Speak orNot to Speak: Musings on JudicialSilence, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 1147, 1152 (2004).
282. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 48, at 239-40 (noting that courts must be respected by the
public in order to remain effective). Indeed, judicial power is synonymous with the sense of
"legitimacy" that I use in this Article, viz., the extent to which the public acquiesces in a decision
it views as wrong. Professor Fallon has termed this "authoritative legitimacy," and sees it as a
subset of "sociological legitimacy," which is concerned primarily with public obedience to judicial
decisions, as opposed to a more normative vision of legitimacy under which the important question
is whether the decision is in some sense "right." See Fallon, supra note 205, at 1827-33.
283. See, e.g., In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290-93 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that the state must
ensure that the judicial system is fair and impartial for all litigants); Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.,
PreservingJudicialIndependence--An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835,839 (2002) (citing
the importance of public respect for the law); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do AppearancesMatter?:Judicial
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of the political machinery that is the antithesis of law, public respect for
judicial decisions will diminish (we are warned), z84 and the
2 85judiciary will
lose its power to enforce law when that law is unpopular.
Left unspecified, however, are the specific consequences feared by
proponents of the restrictions. A range of public responses to an
"illegitimate" judiciary is possible, from open defiance of court decisions
86
to the election of leaders determined to set the courts on a different path,
but in any event the capacity of courts to be policymakers will be reduced
if the public loses respect for judges. Pro-restriction forces benefit from
the ambiguity of exactly what they fear might happen ifjudges spoke their
minds about politics. It may very well be a compelling interest to protect
the power of courts to issue decisions and have decrees obeyed. Thus,
Impartialityandthe Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REv. 606, 611 (2002) (arguing that
the appearance of favoritism can undermine public confidence in the judiciary).
284. Interestingly, there is no evidence that public acquiescence in judicial decisions depends
on a perception that judges hold no political views. See Mark Kozlowski, Should the Regulation
of JudicialCandidateSpeech Regarding Legal andPoliticalIssues Be Reconsidered?,43 S. TEX.
L. REv. 161, 172 (2001); Snyder, supra note 48, at 241-43; Wendel, supranote 115, at 85 (noting
that judges often openly engage in criticism and public perception of legitimacy remains
unaffected). There is, however, evidence that judicial decisions are more likely to be obeyed if the
public believed them to be arrived at "deliberatively" rather than in a "partisan" manner. See
Gibson et al., supra note 65, at 192; Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the
Empowerment of DiscretionaryLegal Authority: The United States Supreme Court andAbortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 783-89 (1994).
As indicated earlier, political speech may be restricted only when the restriction satisfies strict
scrutiny. See supra note 6. The narrow-tailoring portion of the strict-scrutiny test would appear to
require such "'empirical support or at least sound reasoning"' before political speech is restrained,
for without such support the Canons risk suppressing speech without achieving any benefit from
the suppression. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Suster v.
Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529-32 (6th Cir. 1998) (discounting statistical evidence that a majority of
the public viewed limits on judicial campaign spending as beneficial in reducing contributors'
influence); Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lanunie, Perceptionsof Corruptionand CampaignFinance:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 125 (2004)
("[W]hen the scale and nature of the harm is not obvious, evidence as to its existence is usually a
necessary predicate to such speech being regulated under constitutional law."). But see Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty
and plausibility of the justification raised."); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(permitting a restriction on speech supported by "[a] long history, a substantial consensus, and
simple common sense," but not on empirical data). A speech restriction cannot be a narrowly
tailored way of achieving a compelling interest if it does not in fact advance the proffered interest.
285. See, e.g., Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1292 (per curiam); FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 48 (1849)

("[T]o the judiciary, as to the church, political consequence is moral peril; ... the moment it
canvasses for popular honour or executive favours-that moment the magic of its powers is
gone .... "); The Way Forward,supra note 254, at 657.
286. See Fallon, supra note 205, at 1832-33.
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comments about the importance of the judiciary sometimes suggest that
the very survival of the separation of powers is at stake. 287 But such an
apocalyptic vision is unlikely to materialize. In spite of the judiciary's
extremely limited capacity to force compliance with its decisions,
compliance is what it receives. And even after such controversial decisions
as Bush v. Gore,288 public respect for the Court is reasonably high.289 It is
therefore difficult to see how squelching judicial speech is narrowly
tailored to protect the power of the judiciary to enforce its decisions.
If judicial legitimacy is compromised by actions short of outright
disobedience, however, then speech restrictions begin to serve that end
more directly. Judicial legitimacy might be threatened whenever the public
seeks to challenge judicial authority, even by lawful means. That is, a
public movement to use the political process to reverse a trend of court
decisions is subversive ofjudicial power, perhaps so much as a refusal to
abide by a court order. When legitimacy is used in this way, the elections
of Franklin Roosevelt, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan, and the ouster
of California Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues damaged
the "legitimacy" of the United States and California Supreme Courts by
making it more difficult for those courts to enact policy as they had prior
to the elections. Perhaps limitations on judges' political speech seek to
enhance judicial legitimacy, not in the sense of inducing the public to
comply with court orders, but of making it difficult to challenge courts'
counter-majoritarian policymaking role.

287. See 0. Carter Snead, Dynamic Complementarity: Terri 'sLaw andSeparationof Powers
Principlesin the End-of-Life Context, 57 FLA. L. REV. 53, 77-78 (noting that the insulation of the
judicial branch from encroachment by the other branches ofgovernment "serves both to protect 'the
role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government' and to
safeguard litigants' 'rights to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government' (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833,848 (1946) (citation omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980))). In this respect,
one notes the frequent mentions in the debate on judicial free speech of "telephone justice," a
phenomenon in Communist countries where a political leader telephones a judge and provides
instructions for deciding a case. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes:
Perspectives on JudicialIndependence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 5-6 (2003); Gerald E. Rosen, Judicial
Independencein an Age ofPoliticaland MediaScrutiny, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 685,690 (1997);
Shepard, supra note 237, at 811 & n.2. Chief Justice Shepard goes so far as to claim that reviewing
judges' philosophies when considering them for promotion is a "stealthy form oftelephonej ustice."
Shepard, supra note 237, at 817; see also Scheppele, supra note 45 (arguing that judicial
independence is compromised both by telephone justice and by rules of law that constrain judicial
discretion).
288. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
289. See Friedman, supranote 34, at 2627-29; James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Courtand
the US PresidentialElection of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SC.
535, 535, 555 (2003).
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60

Dimino:COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN
Counter-Majoritarian
Power
Judges'
Political
Speech
POWER
AND and
JUDGES'
POLITICAL
SPEECH

Speech restrictions, insofar as they encourage the public to envision
judges as non-political, may well have the effect of discouraging the public
from seeking to alter judicial policy through politics (though I am aware
of no data on the issue). Even if there is a narrowly tailored relationship
here, however, there remains the compelling interest requirement. It is one
thing to claim a compelling interest in enforcing court decisions; it is quite
another to claim a compelling interest in protecting the judiciary as an
unaccountable policymaker. If, indeed, the restrictions on judges' speech
are in place to sustain the policymaking power of the judiciary, they would
seem to be unconstitutional.
Restrictions on judicial participation in non-judicial politics are also
justified by a concern for protecting impartiality: Judges should not be so
connected to a party or candidate that they cannot fairly adjudicate a
dispute involving that party, candidate, or an opponent of either. One need
not quarrel with the contention that establishing or maintaining this kind
of judicial impartiality is a compelling state interest. 290 Indeed, public
tolerance of judicial review depends on judges being able to dispense
justice according to law, irrespective of the political influence of the
parties or any personal connection between the judge and a party to a case
before him.29' Similarly, restrictions on judicial support (financial and
otherwise) for political candidates serve two interests related to this
concern about impartiality. First, they ensure that parties and officials do
not extort political support from judges in return for party nominations and
the like. Second, by prohibiting campaign contributions by judges, they
ensure that the public will not perceive nominations for judicial office as
being for sale.292
In practical application, however, restrictions on judicial political
activity serve the goal of impartiality quite indirectly, if at all. Prohibiting
a judge from making contributions does nothing to ensure that a judge's
initial nomination was not the result of contributions made in years past as
a private citizen. 29' And parties should seek to be faithful to long-term

290. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There could hardly be a higher governmental interest
than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary.").
291. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on JudicialIndependence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV.
603 (1998) (noting the importance of an impartial, fair judiciary); William H. Rehnquist, Keynote
Address, 46 Am.U. L. REv. 267, 271-74 (1996) (noting thatjudicial independence is essential); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (same).
292. See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
293. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 760 n. 11 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting
that Minnesota Supreme Court Justices "are often, if not always, former partisan office holders or
party activists"); see also id. at 758 ("A regulation requiring a candidate to sweep under the rug his
overt association with a political party for a few months during a judicial campaign, after a lifetime
of commitment to that party, is similarly underinclusive in the purported pursuit of an interest in
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supporters by providing them nominations and electoral support. Parties
may justifiably believe that long-term supporters are more likely to bring
the ideals of the party to the bench than is someone who has never worked
on the party's behalf. Additionally, there is a ready remedy for concerns
of party abuse of the judicial nomination process that does not limit
political speech: Hold nonpartisan elections, where candidates need not
seek the approval of the party leadership to earn a spot on the ballot.
Granted, party endorsement may be important even in a nonpartisan
general election,294 but the interest in limiting party influence on an
election is far less important than limiting the power of parties to be
gatekeepers, controlling access to the ballot on the basis of contributions.
Furthermore, if a judge must recuse himself whenever his impartiality
' then there
"might reasonably be questioned,"295
is little risk of a biased
decision resulting from a judge's politicking; a judge will recuse himself
whenever his support for a candidate or party makes him unable fairly to
evaluate a lawsuit.296 Perhaps there is an interest in ensuring that each
judge is eligible to hear the potentially numerous cases involving a public
official in the jurisdiction, but stopping a judge from communicating
publicly his support for a candidate or party hardly advances that
interest. 297 Because most judges can be assumed to have parties and
candidates they support,29 8 if we infer bias whenever a litigant is connected
to a party or candidate supported or opposed by the judge, then no judge
would be qualified to rule on any case involving the government.299 Even
under the ABA Canons, political agreement or disagreement with a public
official is not enough to raise even a question of bias unless the public is

judicial openmindedness.").
294. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 305-15 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
295. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
296. See White, 416 F.3d at 755.
297. See Dimino, supra note 30, at 340-43; cf.Cbeneyv. United States Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913,
928-29 (2004) (Scalia, J., memorandum opinion denying motion for recusal) ("The question.., is
whether someone who thought I could decide this case impartially despite my friendship with the
Vice President would reasonably believe that I cannot decide it impartially because I went hunting
with that friend and accepted an invitation to fly there with him on a Government plane.").
298. Under appointive systems, to cite only the most obvious example, the public might
believe judges maintain some affinity for the officials who appointed them as well as for the parties
of those officials. It would not surprise anyone or raise a claim of bias if we were to learn that Chief
Justice Rehnquist regularly votes for Republican candidates and Justice Ginsburg regularly votes
for Democrats.
299. A judge who supports a particular candidate or party is just as "biased" in favor of that
candidate or party (and against opponents) whether he keeps his support private or whether he
announces his support publicly. And if taken seriously the bias argument proves too much. It would
require judges not to have any friends, and not to hold any opinions about any other persons, lest
that person be treated unfairly by the judge in some hypothetical future case.
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informed of that agreement or disagreement.3 "° Accordingly, the interest
served by preventing judges from announcingtheir political positions is
not eliminating bias, but merely convincing the public that no "bias" exists
so as to maintain judicial legitimacy and power.
As the Supreme Court pointed out in White, a speech restriction's
underinclusivity raises an inference that the purported rationales for the
restriction are not in fact the actual motivations.3 °1 Here, the Canons fail
to restrict much conduct-such as attendance at fundraisers, private
campaign fundraising through committees, associations with interest
groups, 30 2 and campaigning generally° 03-that damages "impartiality" and
"independence" as much as does the conduct that is restricted. 3 Thus, one
is left with the conclusion that the Canons are concerned more with public
appearances than with substance,30 5 and the only reasons for a concern
with appearance are judicial vanity and power.
The restrictions concededly help ensure that public confidence in the
judiciary not be diminished, for without a public willing to accept judicial
decisions, the power of the courts is lost.3°6 Ifjudges are considered by the
public to be merely one species of politician, then there is little reason for
the public to accept the lawmaking of the least-representative, leastaccountable branch of government.3 7 Accordingly, the Canons seek to
maintain and increase judicial power by making the courts appear different
from the politicians in the other branches. And one way of accomplishing
this is by removing judges from politics--or appearing to do so.
Still, while judicial legitimacy is important, the regulations forbid
judges' voluntary participation in the political process-a cost of the
highest constitutional magnitude.308 They have less of an impact on voters

300. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(1)(b) (2003).
301. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (citing City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 52-53 (1994); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in
judgment)).
302. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 759-61 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
303. See White, 536 U.S. at 788, 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
304. See supra notes 34-37, 47-49, 198-99 and accompanying text.
305. See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues ofJudicialEthics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1105
(2004).
306. See, e.g., Snyder, supranote 48, at 239-40.
307. Cf Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: ComprehensiveRationalityin the Writing
andReadingofStatutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (1991) ("[I]deology, the most exalted motive
that most theories attribute to legislators, is the basest motive generally attributed to judges.").
308. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 774 ("[S]peech about the qualifications of candidates for
public office" occupies "'the core of our First Amendment freedoms."') (quoting the opinion
below, Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001)); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (opining that campaign speech "occupies the core
of the protection afforded by the First Amendment"); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) ("[T]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
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than do restrictions on judicial campaigns, but their effect on the judges
themselves is more severe. 30 9 As Judge Jon Blue explained, "Periodic
campaigns for judicial office . . . occupy only a small portion of an
incumbent judge's life.... But canonical 'political activity' restrictions

intrude, in one way or another, upon the lives of incumbent judges on
almost a daily basis."3 ' Only the counter-majoritarian Justices will likely
view the interest in judicial legitimacy as sufficiently compelling to allow
states to force their judges to bear the cost of that intrusion.
V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHITE FOR RESTRICTIONS ON
JUDICIAL SPEECH IN NON-JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

What White means for the future of judicial free speech, particularly
regarding the Canons that restrict judicial participation in non-judicial
campaigns, will be determined by cases that will be heard by a Court with
a different membership than the Rehnquist Court of 2002. Whether White
foretells the invalidation of a great many restrictions on judicial politics
depends on which philosophy the Court chooses to employ in those future
cases. Four alternatives are possible.
First, majoritarians, represented by Justice Scalia's opinion of the
Court, might object to the idealistic vision of courts encouraged by the
restrictions because that approach enables the policymaking that
majoritarians oppose. Even though voters' rights to control judicially made
policies are not directly at issue, as they were in White, the Court might
conclude that the public should not be made to surrender policymaking
authority under the belief that judges are apolitical.
Second, the Justices who saw the announce clause as constitutional and
necessary to the enforcement of unpopular laws will continue to support
restrictions even when they limit speech in non-judicial campaigns
because they believe those restrictions, too, seek to increase the legitimacy
of the judiciary and, therefore, its power to render counter-majoritarian
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.") (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (noting the paramount
importance of freedom ofpolitical debate); NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,913
(1982) (same); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (same); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (referring to the "freedom of thought and speech" as "the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom").
309. But see In re Amendment of Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 60, Code of Judicial
Conduct-Campaigns, Elections, Political Activity (Wisc. 2004) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring)
(slip op. at 10-11) (referring to the restrictions as "minor inconvenience[s]"). Chief Justice
Abrahamson may have an interest in characterizing the restrictions as "minor inconvenience[s]";
four incumbentjustices on her court publicly endorsed her opponent in her 1999 election. See supra
note 249.
310. Jon C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? ExtrajudicialPoliticalActivity, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHIcs 1, 3 (2004).
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decisions. Majoritarian Justices are unlikely to find such an interest
compelling, but counter-majoritarians are.
Third, the Court might attempt to draw the line at loosening restrictions
only for judicial campaigns, reasoning that limits on political speech of
sitting judges do not impact voters to the same extent as limits on
campaign speech. While this approach would be consistent with the
portions of White that stressed the importance of making judges
accountable to the voters, it would ignore the realism that motivated
White's concern with out-of-control courts. The instrumental argument for
judicial free speech is powerful, not only because judges can act as
"representative" policymakers, affecting policy consistent with
constituents' desires, but also because judges' own ideological views
influence their behavior on the bench. White encouraged campaign speech
"'
so voters could choose the candidate whose views most matched theirs.31
Accordingly, squelching speech to promote the idea that judges lack
political views ignores White's attempt to point out the obvious: The
public already knows that judges have political views, even in states (or
the federal system)3" 2 where judges are appointed. The genie is out of the
bottle, brushing his teeth with toothpaste that is out of the tube, riding a
horse that has walked through an open barn door, and playing with a cat
that is already out of the bag.31 3
Fourth, Justices who adopt the approach of Justice Kennedy would be
willing to protect political speech, even by judges, because of the
expressive benefit it provides to the speaker and his audience rather than
because of the effect the Canons will have on judicial policy. For them,
restrictions on judges' political involvement are, by and large,
unconstitutional because they rest on a rationale insupportable in a regime
of popular sovereignty: that core political speech and association can be
limited so the people do not question part of the government. 1 4 Though
Justice Kennedy's approach might be thought to be a standard application
of First Amendment principles3 r-after all, Minnesota suppressed speech
in an election campaign to immunize elite, undemocratic policymakers
from criticism and electoral defeat3 '-all eight other Justices rejected that

311. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784, 787-88 (2002).
312. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 7 (1999).
313. Cf Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026,
1032 (2003) (illustrating how the slippery slope occurs).
314. See, e.g., Dimino, supranote 30, at 382 (arguing against restrictions on judges' speech).
315. See, e.g., SEGAL ET AL., supra note 143, at 156 ("The majority, strictly on free speech
grounds, had the much better of the argument. The state prohibited communication on the basis of
its content.., and exacerbated this factor by applying it to political activity ....");
see also 2
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:32, at 16-131 (2005)
("[P]ledges to the people [to change the law or alter social policy] are at the core of the free
expression the First Amendment was designed to secure.").
316. See White, 536 U.S. at 787 (noting the "obvious tension" between judicial elections and
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view at least for the time being, with four contending that judicial speech
was in a different category altogether, and four others leaving open the
speech should be given less freedom
possibility that judicial campaign
3
than other types of speech. 1
We should not be surprised that restrictions on speech have political
consequences; 318 indeed, historically that has often been the point of
restricting speech and has been one of the reasons the Supreme Court in
the last ninety years has protected it.319 Neither should we be surprised that
a Court that has involved itself in an unprecedented number of political
disputes 320 would perceive a First Amendment challenge to campaign
speech as a case about political power. And where the political power at
issue belongs to the courts, we should not be surprised that the battle is
joined between those who want to give the courts enough power to force
others to abide by the law and those who want to give others enough
power to force the courts to abide by it.

the announce clause); id.at 782 ("[T]he purpose behind the announce clause is... the undermining
of judicial elections."). Cf. Dimino, supra note 56, at 819 (suggesting that selection may be "a
rigged process to ensure the continued policy influence of elites who cannot justify their decisions
to the electorate").
317. See White, 536 U.S. at 783 (opinion ofthe Court); id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 803-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
318. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it."); see also McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 284 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the majority of the Court would permit regulation of the press, and that "[t]here is little doubt that
the editorials and commentary they [the media] run can affect elections").
319. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[Glovernment cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of
political debate."); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (noting the
importance of speech in a free society).
320. See RIcHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY

FROMBAKER V.CARR TOBUSH V.GORE 1-3 (2003); see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than
Court?: The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (arguing that in recent years the Supreme Court has ignored the
existence of political questions).
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